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The creation and drawing of district voting lines in order to
benefit racial minorities has spurred several recent Supreme Court
decisions and generated mountains of commentary. This
attention, however, has been directed at the drawing of district
lines for the House of Representatives. In this unique and
intriguing Article Professor Smith posits a different form of
districting-United States Senate districting. Drawing from the
history and text of the Seventeenth Amendment and the Elections
Clause of Article I, Professor Smith argues that the creation of
Senate districts is a permissible, though not required, activity. As
Professor Smith points out, such a proposal would have benefits
for both racial minorities and campaign finance reform.
Anticipating objections to his proposal on Equal Protection
grounds, Professor Smith concludes with a discussion of recent
Supreme Court rulings and defends his proposal within this
framework For states such as California and New York, with
divergent racial makeups and political ideologies rooted in
geography, the implications of Professor Smith's Article are
widespread and signifigant.
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The Constitution does not mention legislative electoral districts.
Federal law, however, requires members of the House of Representa-
tives to be elected by district,' a procedure that was indisputably
2contemplated by the Framers. In contrast, all fifty states currently
elect their United States Senators in at-large, statewide elections.3 At-
1. See 2 U.S.C. § 2e (1994).
2. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 240-41 (Max
Farrand ed., 1966) [hereinafter RECoRDs OF THE CONVENTION]; see also Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 122 (1970) ("Surely no voter qualification was more important to
the Framers than the geographical qualification embodied in the concept of congressional
districts.").
3. The eleven state statutes which expressly provide for "at-large" or "statewide"
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large Senate elections exacerbate some of the most significant prob-
lems in American politics. Illustratively, such at-large arrangements
contribute to the underrepresentation of minorities in the Senate.4 In-
deed, the United States Senate has been derided as a "white male
club."' Does the Constitution require that the election procedures for
the Senate be different from the House? If not, state legislatures, Con-
election of United States Senators are: ALA. CODE § 17-2-2 (1995); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 9-178 (West 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-542 (1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 39.10
(West 1996); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. § 21-1 (1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.92
(West 1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-855 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653:3
(1995); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 12-200 (McKinney 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-13-08
(1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.80.010 (West 1996).
Thirty-six state statutes provide for election of United States Senators without refer-
ence to an "at-large" or "statewide" election: ALASKA STAT. § 15.30.110 (Michie 1995);
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-213 (West 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-102 (Michie 1995);
CAL. ELEC. CODE § 10720 (West 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-4-202 (Supp. 1995); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 4307 (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.081 (West 1995); HAW. REv.
STAT. § 17-1 (1994); IDAHO CODE § 59-910 (1996); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/2-3 (West
1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-10-8-7 (Michie 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-101 (1995); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 118.465 (Michie 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1278 (West 1996);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 391 (West 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 204B.08 (West
1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-25-201 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 304.010 (1993); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 19:3-26 (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-12 (Michie 1995); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 163-12 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3501.02 (Anderson 1996); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 12-101 (West 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 188.120 (1995); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
25, § 2751 (West 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-4-9 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-19-10 (Law.
Co-op. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-11-1 (Michie 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-16-
101 (1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-13-201 (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2621
(1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-206 (Michie 1995); W. VA. CODE § 3-1-15 (1996); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 8.25(2) (West Supp. 1995); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-105 (Michie 1996).
In none of the aforementioned states are Senators currently elected by districts.
Finally, Massachusetts, Missouri, and Texas appear to have no specific provision for
the election of United States Senators but do not currently elect Senators by districts.
4. Racial minorities currently constitute only four percent of the Senate's member-
ship. See Donna Cassata, Freshman Class Boasts Resumes to Back Up 'Outsider' Image,
52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 9, 10 (Supp. 1994). This is the largest number of minorities to
hold Senate seats in the past twenty years. See 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE U.S.
CONGRESS 1371-72 (Donald C. Bacon et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE CONGRESS]; Cassata, supra, at 10; John R. Cranford, The New Class: More Diverse,
Less Lawyerly, Younger, 50 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 7,8 (Supp. 1992). There is little ques-
tion that this underrepresentation is the result of at-large elections, for such elections
have long been found to lead to the underrepresentation of minorities. See, e.g., Thorn-
burg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 33 (1986) ("This Court has long recognized that
multimember districts and at-large voting schemes may 'operate to minimize or cancel
out the voting strength of racial [minorities in] the voting population.'" (citations omit-
ted)); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 92-93 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[A]t-
large systems characteristically place one or more minority groups at a significant disad-
vantage in the struggle for political power....").
5. Richard S. Dunham, Congress' Rookies Will Be Ready To Rock, BUS. WK., Sept.
14, 1992, at 56, 57 (discussing the common perception of the United States Senate as a
"white-male club" and noting that the presence of only two female Senators-a number
which has since increased-was mere tokenage).
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gress and the judiciary are all free to adopt districting, a change that
may enhance the opportunity for minority representation.
Senate districts may also help to solve another conundrum in
American politics: the undue influence of money in political cam-
paigns. In the absence of campaign finance reform imposing spending
limits on Senate candidates, cutting the costs of running for the Senate
by cutting the territory in which candidates must campaign may be an
effective means of checking the influence of monied interests on the
upper house.6 With decreased costs, there would likely be a corre-
sponding increase in the range of candidates able to run and the
spectrum of interests able to be heard in Senate races.7 Determining
the constitutionality of Senate districts is fundamental to addressing
these and other current concerns of democratic representation.8
Commentators assume without analysis that United States Sena-
tors cannot be elected by districts. In his recent book on the direct
election of Senators, C.H. Hoebeke takes for granted that Senators
must be elected from a statewide constituency.9 Oddly, the author pro-
ceeds on this assumption even though he acknowledges that at-large
Senate elections actually defeat one of the central purposes of allowing
the people to directly elect their Senators: to rid campaigns of the in-
fluence of corporate money previously associated with the legislative
appointment of Senators. 10
Judge Frank Easterbrook further typifies the reflexive nature of
the statewide assumption in arguing that the at-large election of Sena-
tors was integral to a constitutional scheme whose success depended
largely on fragmentation: "Fragmentation [was] to be pursued in a
6. The average cost of a successful Senate race in 1994 was $4.4 million. See Wil-
liam Douglas, The Pendulum Swings/Democrats Eye The Majority, NEWSDAY, Apr. 28,
1996, at A04. The comparable figure for House races was $535,000. See id.
7. Nothing more readily confirms this hypothesis than the major parties' candidate
recruitment for 1996 Senate races. Democrats, not known as the party of the rich, have
made a concerted effort to recruit wealthy entrepreneurs as candidates because such candi-
dates are willing to finance a substantial part of their own campaigns. See Robert M. Wells
& Jonathan D. Salant, Wealthy Democrats are Tapped to Challenge GOP Senators, 54 CONG.
Q. WKLY. REP. 443,443-44 (1996).
8. The examples of increased representation for racial minorities and the advancement
of campaign finance reform are, again, merely illustrative of the salutary effects of Senate
districts. However, because each of these issues is currently salient in the public's eye and,
moreover, is uniquely relevant to the principal constitutional provision explored in this Arti-
cle, the Seventeenth Amendment, they are highlighted. See infra notes 281-334 and
accompanying text.
9. See C.H. HOEBEKE, THE ROAD TO MASS DEMOCRAcY: ORIGINAL INTENT AND
THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT 2,16-17, 88,90,176,194 (1995).
10. See id. at 98-99,102-06.
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thoroughgoing manner: different state qualifications for voting; differ-
ent districts for officials to represent... portions of states for members
of the House, whole states for senators .... ."" So commonplace is the
statewide assumption that Easterbrook offered no citations to support
it. He has been joined by other notable commentators in this prac-
tice.1
2
The Supreme Court has been no less casual in its statements about
the electoral basis of the Senate. Again without citation, the Court has
stated that "[m]embers of the Federal Senate are of course elected
from a State at large, and represent the entire State.""13 Moreover, the
Court has in the recent past stated that the Senate's function is to rep-
resent states as such.14 The inference drawn is that if it is the state which
is represented, elections for the Senate must be on a statewide basis.1
On first impression, the inference appears to draw textual support from
Article V of the Constitution, which entrenches the equal representa-
tion of the states in the Senate. 6 In the Supreme Court's words, "The
significance attached to the States' equal representation in the Senate
is underscored by [Article V's] prohibition of any constitutional
amendment divesting a State of equal representation without the
State's consent.'
7
The vestiges of the original Constitution's provision for the legisla-
tive appointment of Senators 8 reinforce the Court's view and the
11. Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public
Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1332 (1994) (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added).
12. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate Over Affirmative Action, 82
CAL. L. REv. 893, 924-25 (1994) (observing that while the creation of minority districts
has increased minority representation in the House of Representatives, the Senate is
"beyond the reach of creative redistricting"); Bruce E. Fein, A Constitutional Bicentennial
Celebration: Original Intent and the Constitution, 47 MD. L. REv. 196, 205 (1987)
("[E]ach state is entitled to two Senators, who are elected from statewide constituencies
for six-year terms.") (emphasis added); Saul Levmore, Bicameralism" When Are Two
Decisions Better than One?, INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 145, 154 (1992) (noting that election
of Senators by district would prevent the same coalition of voters in a state from electing
both Senators, but suggesting that this system is not possible because the Constitution
does not "require" Senate districts).
13. Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695,709 n.19 (1964) (emphasis added).
14. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,551 (1985).
15. See, eg., Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Com-
pactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REa. 173, 178 n.19 (1989)
("[S]enators are elected by states, precisely because states, as geographic entities, were given
a role in the federal government as part of the constitutional compromise.").
16. See U.S. CONST. art. V ("[N]o State ... shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in
the Senate.").
17. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551.
18. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVII, cl. 1.
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statewide assumption. Senators were appointed by state legislatures
under Article I, Section 4, Clause I as a bulwark against democratic
excesses by the people and, at least in the view of some Framers, in or-
der to represent the states in their sovereign capacities." House
members, on the other hand, were directly elected by the people in or-20 "  u hs
der to represent popular interests. By continuing to impute these
differences in mission to the House and Senate,2' the statewide assump-
tion has been elevated to a priori status.
If the statewide assumption ever truly had a constitutional basis,
that basis has long since dissipated after the ratification of the Seven-
teenth Amendment in 1913. The Amendment provides, in relevant
part: "The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Sena-
tors from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years .... "2
The Amendment is modeled on Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 of the
Constitution, under which House members are elected by districts:
"The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen
every second Year by the People of the several States .... " After pas-
sage of the Seventeenth Amendment, the "Federal Government [is]
directly responsible to the people,... and chosen directly, not by
States, but by the people."' 3 Thus, whatever the initial concerns that
prompted the Framers to insulate Senators from popular elections,
Senators now share the same constituency as House members-the
people-and thus should be able to be elected in the same manner.
This Article's purpose is to demonstrate that Senate districts are
permitted, but not compelled under the Constitution, especially after
ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment providing for the direct
24election of Senators. Although other modes of analysis are feasible,this Article presents the textual and historical case for the constitution-
19. See infra notes 95-151 and accompanying text.
20. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; see also infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text
(discussing Framers' decisions regarding election of House members).
21. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551 ("[The States] were given.., direct influence in the
Senate, where each State received equal representation and each Senator was to be se-
lected by the legislature of his State.") (citing, inter alia, JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 176 (1980) ("[T]he Senate ... could
be depended upon to protect States' rights .....
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
23. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1863 (1995).
24. Clause 1 of the Seventeenth Amendment provides in full that:
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each
State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have
one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for
electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. 1.
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ality of Senate districts.25 The Article draws on the "translation" model
of fidelity, examining not merely the original understanding of the
relevant text at the time of enactment, but also the changed circum-
stances to which the original understanding must be applied. The
Article then reinterprets the text in light of the changed factual setting,
seeking a modem analogue to the original understanding.26
Part I of this Article is an evaluation of the relevant text of the
Constitution. Part II examines the pre-Seventeenth Amendment Sen-
ate. Part III examines the legislative history of the Seventeenth
Amendment. It concludes with a discussion of the implications of the
Amendment's ratification. Here, the Article translates original intent
by identifying three contemporary circumstances to which the broad
purposes of the Seventeenth Amendment can be applied to justify
Senate districts: the political participation of minorities, the excessive
influence of money in political campaigns and the emergence of uni-
formity in the representational capacities and institutional characters of
the House and Senate. Anticipating equal protection concerns with
any Senate district drawn with the first circumstance in mind, this dis-
cussion demonstrates that such districts can be drawn to comport with
Fourteenth Amendment requirements.
I. THE TEXTUAL ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERAL SENATE DISTRICTS
The most compelling arguments in support of federal Senate dis-
tricts are based on the text of the Constitution. Viewing the
Constitution holistically, four textual arguments emerge. The first is
based on the Elections Clause of Article I, Section 4, which grants
states the authority to determine the time, place and manner of Senate
and House elections, subject to the federal government's prerogative to
override state regulation.27 Since this provision permits states or the
federal government to create congressional districts, it should likewise
permit them to draw federal Senate districts.
The second textual basis for federal Senate districts is the Qualifi-
cations Clause of the Seventeenth Amendment, which establishes the
same qualifications for voting in Senate elections as those for partici-
25. One could, alternatively, render a present-oriented interpretation of the relevant
text. Such an analysis would not seek to uncover the original intent of the drafters, but
would instead endeavor to construe the Constitution in light of contemporary needs and
values. See Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REv. 104, 107 (1989).
26. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1165, 1263 (1993);
William M. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political
Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 857 (1995).
27. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
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pating in elections for the most numerous branch of a state legislature.
Since this provision allows states to impose district residency require-
ments on voters in congressional races and in state legislative races, a
state should similarly be free to adopt district residency requirements
as a prerequisite to voting in Senate elections.
Third, the Tenth Amendment's reservation of undelegated power
to the states and the people may permit the creation of federal Senate
districts. Although in its most recent pronouncement on the Tenth
Amendment in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton2 the Supreme Court
was sharply divided over the Amendment's substantive contours, fed-
eral Senate districts comport with the divergent interpretations offered
in Thornton. Finally, there are potential negative inferences that may
be drawn from the Constitution's text, namely Article V's guarantee of
equal representation in the Senate and the Constitution's bicameral
structure. However, as will be shown, Article V by its own terms does
not control the question of Senate districts, and districting would not
defeat the Founders' purposes in creating a bicameral national legisla-
ture.
A. The Elections Clause of Article I
Under the original Constitution, the legislature of each state ap-
pointed two United States Senators. The Constitution gave broad
discretion to the state legislatures to determine the manner in which
they elected federal Senators:
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each
State by the Legislature thereof; but Congress may at any
time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to
the Places of choosing Senators.30
Thus, subject only to Congress's supervisory authority, the Elections
Clause of Article I left to the states decisions regarding the procedures
for electing Senators.3'
As a "manner" of electing Senators, legislatures could have, either
28. 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
29. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 ("The Senate of the United States shall be com-
posed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years;
and each Senator shall have one Vote.").
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, ci. 1.
31. For instance, the Elections Clause left to the states' discretion the coordination of
votes between the upper and lower houses of state legislatures. See JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 256 (Carolina Aca-
demic Press 1987) (1833).
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formally or informally, adopted a system that required that one Sena-
tor come from the northern portion of the state, while the other hail
from the southern.' 2 Nothing in the plain language of the Elections
Clause prohibits such districting; to the contrary, the very breadth of
the term "manner" implicitly countenances this and many other prac-
tices, as long as such procedures do not run afoul of the Constitution.33
Contemporaneous interpretations of the Elections Clause by the
leading commentators of the period support the view that "manner"
means all procedures that are not otherwise prohibited by the Consti-
tution. Justice Joseph Story wrote that "[i]t was obviously
impracticable to frame, and insert in the constitution an election law,
which would be applicable to all possible changes in the situation of the
country and convenient for all the states." Accordingly, "[tihe regula-
tion of elections is submitted, in the first instance, to the local
governments, which, in ordinary cases, and when no improper views
prevail, may both conveniently and satisfactorily be by them exer-
cised."35
In McPherson v. Blacker,36 the Supreme Court compared the Elec-
tions Clause of Article I to the provision in Article II, Section 1, Clause
3 for the selection of members to the state electoral college for pur-
poses of electing the President.37 Article II provides in relevant part:
"Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature thereof may
direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of senators and
representatives to which the state may be entitled .... In upholding
a Michigan law mandating the selection of presidential electors by dis-
tricts, the Court noted that districting for the House of Representatives
had been permitted under the Elections Clause of Article I and found
this a convincing parallel. The Court concluded that
[t]he constitution does not provide that the appointment of
32. See infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
33. See STORY, supra note 31 at 292; see also Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 24
(1972) ("Unless Congress acts, Art. I, § 4, empowers the states to regulate the conduct of
senatorial elections."); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 122 (1970) ("It cannot be
doubted that these comprehensive words [contained in the Elections Clause] embrace
authority to provide a complete code for congressional elections ... ."); Smiley v. Holm,
285 U.S. 355, 367 (1932) (noting the broad congressional authority conferred by Article I,
§ 4, cl. 2); Wilson v. United States, 878 F. Supp. 1324, 1327 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (upholding
the recent motor-voter registration law under the "broad power" granted Congress by
Article I, § 4).
34. STORY, supra note 31, at 292.
35. Id.
36. 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
37. See id. at 26.
38. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
1996]
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electors shall be by popular vote, nor that the majority of
those who exercise the elective franchise can alone choose
the electors. It recognizes that the people act through their
representatives in the legislature, and leaves it to the legisla-
ture exclusively to define the method of effecting the
object.39
At the very least, McPherson confirms that three of four federal
elective officers-House members, the President and the Vice-
President-may be elected directly or indirectly under a districting
scheme. Fairly read, McPherson also supports a broad reading of the
Constitution's delegation to the states of the authority to prescribe
methods for conducting all federal elections. As a textual matter, the
Elections Clause of Article I appears to have always permitted the
election of Senators by districts.
The passage of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913 fortifies the
argument that such districts are permissible today. The Seventeenth
Amendment provides that:
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for
six years, and each Senator shall have one vote. The elec-
tors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for
electors of the most numerous branch of the State legisla-
tures.40
The language of the Seventeenth Amendment closely resembles
Article I, Section 2, Clause I of the Constitution:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of Mem-
bers chosen every second Year by the People of the several
States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifi-
cations requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch
of the State Legislature.41
Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized these directives as
"parallel provision[s]." 42 Most recently, the Court has recognized the
39. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 27.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. 1.
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
42. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 227 (1986). In Tashjian, the
Court analyzed the Qualifications Clauses of Article I and the Seventeenth Amendment
to determine whether there could be any variation between the qualifications for voting in
congressional elections and elections for the most numerous house of a state legislature.
See id. at 225-26. Although the Court discussed Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 and the
Seventeenth Amendment in this context, its reference to their parallelism was not limited
to these provisions' Qualifications Clauses, but rather referred to the central purpose of
both provisions-that each congressional body is to be elected by the people. See id. at
227.
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Seventeenth Amendment as an extension of the ideal embodied in Ar-
ticle I, Section 2, Clause 1-that the "Federal Government [is] directly
responsible to the people,... and chosen directly, not by States, but by
the people."43
The symmetry of structure and purpose between the Seventeenth
Amendment and Article I, Section 2, Clause 1, warrants an analogous
interpretation of each. Given this parallelism, the text of the Seven-
43. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1863 (1995). No decision of
the Supreme Court has differentiated the language of Article I, Section 2 from that of the
Seventeenth Amendment.
Some cases mention Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 and the Seventeenth Amendment
without commenting on differences or similarities. See, e.g., MacDougall v. Green, 335
U.S. 281, 288 (1948), overruled by Moore v. Ogilivie, 394 U.S. 814, 819 (1969); Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 651, 657 (1944); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 365, 374 (1932);
Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232,250-57,260-64,269 (1921).
The bulk of the cases, however, emphasize the parallel nature of Article I, Section 2
and the Seventeenth Amendment. These cases note that under both provisions, Repre-
sentatives and Senators alike are to be elected by the people. See, e.g., Term Limits, 115
S. Ct. at 1863; Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 227; Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 722 n.1 (1974)
(Douglas, J., concurring); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 148-49 (1970); Lassiter v.
Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75, 111 (1947); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941). Justice Douglas
has suggested that both provisions should be construed to apply to primaries. See Stassen
for President Citizens Comm. v. Jordan, 377 U.S. 914, 927 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(denial of certiorari); South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276,279 (1950) (per curiam) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
Another similarity is that both Article I, Section 2 and the Seventeenth Amendment
reserve to the states the right to set voter qualifications. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
243-44 (1962). Under both provisions, the states' right to set voter qualifications is lim-
ited by the requirement that the qualifications for voting in federal legislative races be the
same as the qualifications for voting for the most numerous branch of the state legisla-
ture. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221,227 (1920).
44. See Phillips v. Rockefeller, 435 F.2d 976, 979-81 (2d Cir. 1971). In Phillips, the
Second Circuit was presented with the question of whether election by the people under
the Seventeenth Amendment meant election by a majority of the electorate. See id. at
976. Analogizing to Article I, Section 2, the court concluded that "the deliberate choice
of the drafters of the Seventeenth Amendment to use the words of the section providing
for elections to the House ... demonstrates that they intended the same result-that is,
that elections to the Senate need not be by a majority of the votes cast." Id. at 980; see
also Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 227 ("The fundamental purpose underlying Article I, § 2, cl. 1,
... like the parallel provision of the Seventeenth Amendment, applies to the entire proc-
ess by which federal legislators are chosen."); cf. Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 136
(1922) (noting that the Fifteenth Amendment, prohibiting deprivation of franchise on
grounds of race "is in character and phraseology" similar to the Nineteenth Amendment,
prohibiting deprivation of franchise based on gender and declaring that "[o]ne cannot be
valid and the other invalid").
Although "[t]he use in the Federal Constitution of the same term in different rela-
tions does not always imply the performance of the same function," Smiley, 285 U.S. at
365, it is presumed that identical terms used in different provisions of the Constitution are
intended to have the same meaning. See Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286
U.S. 427,433-34 (1932). If the drafters of the Seventeenth Amendment intended the term
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teenth Amendment is properly construed in light of how the Elections
Clause has been applied to House elections. That districts are a per-
missible means of electing United States Representatives is beyond
serious dispute.
Although the Elections Clause makes no reference to districts,
James Madison and other Framers assumed that states would adopt a
districting system.45 Speaking at the Constitutional Convention in 1787,
Madison acknowledged that the term "Times, Places and Manner" in
Article I's Elections Clause was one of "great latitude" but went on to
illustrate the kinds of measures the clause was intended to compre-
hend:
Whether the electors should vote by ballot or viva voce,
should assemble at this place or that place; should be di-
vided into districts or all meet at one place; should all vote
for all the representatives; or all in a district vote for a num-
ber allotted to the district; these and many other points
would depend on the Legislatures.46 -
By 1842, all but seven states elected Representatives by district.47
Congress eventually imposed a districting system on all states pursuant
to the Elections Clause.48 Districting is a constitutional, well-
institutionalized application of the Elections Clause to House elections.
Whatever may have been the arguments against its application to Sen-
ate elections when Senators were legislatively appointed, such
"the people" to mean something other than what it meant in 1787, it would have made
little sense to model the Amendment so closely on Article I, Section 2. Since all the peo-
ple of a state need not vote on all members of Congress representing the citizens of that
state, all the people of a state need not be permitted to vote for both Senators.
45. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 15 (1964).
46. 2 RECORDS OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 240-41. The debate on the
Elections Clause primarily concerned the national government's authority to override
state election regulations. Proponents of federal authority urged that ultimate federal
control was necessary for the national government's self-preservation. "[E]very govern-
ment," wrote Alexander Hamilton, "ought to contain in itself the means of its own
preservation." THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, at 398 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961) (emphasis omitted). Thus, federal supremacy was necessary to protect against
the possibility of states refusing to elect representatives to the national legislature. See id.
at 399; 3 RECORDS OF THE CONVENSTON, supra note 2, at 345. Six states which ratified
the Constitution adopted a resolution disapproving of the proviso in the Elections Clause
giving Congress override authority, but this section was retained. See Mitchell, 400 U.S.
at 119 n.2.
47. See Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 9 n.11. The seven states which did not adopt a district-
ing system elected Representatives on an at-large, statewide basis, which had been the
common practice in the first fifty years of the nation's history. See id. at 8. That most
states elected House members in the same manner that Senators are currently elected-
on a statewide basis-suggests that the Constitution does not restrict either house of Con-
gress to a statewide or a district-based electoral system.
48. See 2 U.S.C. § 2c (1994); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549,555 (1946).
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objections lack force now that Representatives and Senators alike are
"directly responsible to the people, ... and chosen directly, not by
States, but by the people."49
B. The Qualifications Clause of the Seventeenth Amendment
The Qualifications Clause of the Seventeenth Amendment pro-
vides that "[t]he electors in each State shall have the qualifications
requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of -the State legisla-
tures.""0 The Qualifications Clause of Article I, Section 2 regarding
House elections is nearly identical: "[T]he Electors in each State shall
have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous
Branch of the State Legislature."'" Subject only to the foregoing re-
strictions and the Constitution's anti-discrimination prohibitions, states
determine the qualifications for participation in congressional elec-
tions.
52
States may impose district residency requirements in state legisla-
tive elections. These same states therefore may constitutionally
impose district residency requirements on voters in congressional elec-
tions.- For example, a voter residing in Congressional District 1 m ay
be restricted to voting for candidates on the ballot in that district.
Similarly, a state's "broad powers to determine the conditions under
which the right of suffrage may be exercised ' 56 would allow it to restrict
voter participation in United States Senate elections to geographic
subdivisions.
Although federal Senate districts would be larger in both size and
population than state legislative districts (because there could be only
two Senate districts per state), these districts would not violate the
condition that federal and state voter qualifications be the same. The
49. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842,1863 (1995).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl 1.
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
52. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368,379 (1963).
53. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) ("[T]he States have the power to
require that voters be bona fide residents of the relevant political subdivision."); see also
Kramer v. Union Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 625 (1969) (noting that states have the power to
impose reasonable residency requirements, including district residency requirements).
54. See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343.
55. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. VII, § 1(a) (prescribing durational requirements for
the precinct in which the citizen offers to vote); MIss. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (same); GA.
CODE ANN. § 21-2-451(c) (1994) ("[N]o person shall vote at any primary or election at
any polling place outside the precinct in which such person resides .... "); Christenson v.
Felton, 295 S.W.2d 361, 362 (Ark. 1956) (recognizing that as a general rule, "a voter must
vote in the ward or precinct in which he resides") (citations omitted).
56. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89,91 (1965) (citations omitted).
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Seventeenth Amendment makes the qualifications for state and federal
legislative elections similar but not identical. The qualifications need
only be substantially the same. 7 Indeed, a requirement of identicalness
would invalidate all district residency requirements for House elec-
tions, since House districts, too, do not mirror state legislative districts
in their contours and sizes. Thus, as long as a state chooses to impose
district residency requirements for elections to the largest chamber of
the state legislature, it should also be permitted to impose comparable
qualifications in federal Senate elections.
C. The Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment reserves to the states a residuum of law-
making authority and provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."58
In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton' 9 the Supreme Court held
that the Tenth Amendment does not accord states the power to impose
term limits on federal legislators.' Justice Stevens, writing for a ma-
jority of five, based the Court's holding on two alternate grounds.
First, the Court concluded that the Amendment can only reserve to a
state a power which it possessed before the ratification of the Constitu-
tion." Since the power to establish the credentials for federal
legislators could not possibly have pre-dated the establishment of the
federal government itself, there was no power which the states could
reserve.z Second, and more relevant to the question of Senate dis-
tricts, the Court reasoned that even if the states originally possessed
power to establish qualifications for federal legislators, that power was
divested by the qualifications expressly set forth in Article I, Section 2,
Clause 2 of the Constitution.6
57. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208,229 (1986).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
59. 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
60. See id. at 1856.
61. See id. at 1854.
62. See id. at 1854-55.
63. See id. at 1856. The Qualifications Clause of Article I, Section 2, provides:
No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of
twenty-five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who
shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be cho-
sen.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. The qualifications for Senators are set forth in Article I,
Section 3:
No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained the Age of thirty
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In a dissent joined by three other Justices, Justice Thomas dis-
puted the Court's notion of reserved powers with a simple default rule:
"[W]here the Constitution is silent about the exercise of a particular
power-that is, where the Constitution does not speak either expressly
or by necessary implication-the Federal Government lacks that
power and the States enjoy it."64 Because Article I sets forth only
minimum qualifications which the states may not abolish, he reasoned,
the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states the power to impose term
limits.65
However irreconcilable these positions may be in the context of
term limitations, they do not lead to divergent outcomes when applied
to federal Senate districts. Under the majority's view, since the power
to determine the "manner" of Senate elections is expressly committed
to the states in the first instance, Senate districts would be permissible
if states adopted them and the federal government did not object. The
case for such districts is even plainer under the dissenters' view. Since
Article I's time, place and manner provisions "dof not speak either
expressly or by necessary implication" to the question of Senate dis-
tricts, the Tenth Amendment reserves this power to the states.
67
D. Negative Inferences from the Text
A holistic interpretation of text must, of course, reconcile the
Elections Clause, the Seventeenth Amendment, and the Tenth
Amendment with provisions of the Constitution that might appear to
negate the permissibility of federal Senate districts. Article V's guar-
antee of equal suffrage to the states in the Senate is one such provision.
Article V ensures that "no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived
of its equal Suffrage in the Senate."68 By contrast, Article I, Section 2,
Clause 3 apportions Representatives among the states according to
population: "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be included within this Union, ac-
cording to their respective Numbers ... .,69 Because Article V speaks
of the "State" being deprived of representation in the Senate, the guar-
Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not,
when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
64. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1876 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
65. See id. at 1885 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
66. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
67. See Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1876 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
68. U.S. CoNsT. art. V.
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 2 and U.S.
CONST. amend. XVI.
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antee of equal suffrage in the Senate might seem to mean that the
Framers intended Senators to have a statewide constituency. Article I,
Section 2, Clause 3, in contrast, defines representation in the House in
terms of "numbers" of inhabitants. The implication is that states, as
such, are represented in the Senate while the people are represented in
the House.
Despite this inferential argument, Article V's guarantee of equal
suffrage does not foreclose the creation of federal Senate districts. Ar-
ticle V's equal suffrage guarantee speaks only to the number of
Senators to come from each state; it does not address how each state
may elect its Senators. The manner of election is expressly addressed
in Article I, Section 4, Clause 1.70
Assuming for argument's sake that Article V's equal suffrage
guarantee means that states, rather than individual citizens, are repre-
sented in the Senate, this assumption still would not dictate statewide
elections under the Elections Clause. Each Senator from each state
votes individually.7' The state is not represented as a delegation that
must cast its vote as a bloc, which was the arrangement under the Arti-
cles of Confederation.n Because a state, by definition, may speak With
more than one voice in the United States Senate, it should be free to
apportion its Senate seats to reflect this fact.
73
If the assumption that the Senate represents states as states com-
pels statewide elections for Senators, a corollary mandate would seem
to follow from the assumption that House members represent the peo-
70. Generally, where the subject matter is explicitly committed to a specific provision
of the Constitution, that provision governs all questions within its purview. See Albright
v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) ("Where a particular amendment 'provides an explicit
textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government be-
havior, 'that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of "substantive due process"
must be the guide for analyzing these claims.' " (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
395 (1989))); cf Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prod. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228 (1957)
("However inclusive may be the general language of a statute, 'it will not be held to apply
to a matter specifically dealt with in another part of the same enactment.'" (quoting
Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204,208 (1932))).
71. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S.
CONST. amend. XVII, cl. 1.
72. See U.S. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. V ("[E]ach State shall have one
vote." (emphasis added)).
73. See infra note 198 and accompanying text (arguing no inconsistency between
districting and the representation of sovereign interests). Moreover, neither Article V
nor any other provision gives a state the ability to recall a Senator or to issue a binding
instruction on how to vote. The absence of such restrictions belie the suggestion that the
Framers intended that a Senator represent a state's sovereign interests rather than the
popular interests represented by House members. See infra notes 147-49 and accompa-
nying text.
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ple: House members must be elected by districts. Yet for the first fifty
years of the Republic's history, House members were elected on a
statewide, at-large basis.74 Moreover, the Elections Clause commits to
the states' and federal government's discretion the manner in which
House elections will be held.75
One might observe that it is possible to ensure the representation
of the people either through statewide, at-large elections or through
elections by district; hence, the lack of a House corollary to Article V's
arguable command that Senators be elected statewide. But this incon-
gruity seems implausible in light of the Framers' pattern of expressly
noting the distinctions between the House and the Senate. For in-
stance, the original Constitution explicitly distinguished the electors for
the Senate (state legislatures) from the electors for the House (the
people). In addition, the Senate is expressly given powers that the
House is not, and vice-versa. The Senate possesses the sole power to
7677 .. 78 79try impeachments.76 Treaties, judicial appointments, ambassadors
and heads of federal departments and agenciess' are likewise subject to
the approval of the Senate rather than the House. On the other hand,
all revenue bills must originate in the House.8 Where the Framers
chose not to specify a distinction, they left the matter to the states, as in
the case of the Elections Clause, or to the Senate and House them-
selves, as with the authority of each body to determine its own rules
and judge the qualifications of its own members.2 Against this pattern
of explicit distinctions between the House and Senate, it is highly un-
likely that the Framers left for surmise the important requirement that
Senators be elected on a statewide basis.
Notwithstanding Article V, one may assert the broader argument
that it makes no sense for the Framers to have established a bicameral
national legislature if both houses would be elected in the same fash-
ion. This argument, however, misapprehends Senate districts.
Although similar to House districts, United States Senate districts
would not be composed of the same constituencies as House districts.
They would in most cases be larger and composed of broader constitu-
74. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
75. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
76. See U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
77. See U.S. CONsT. art. H, § 2, cl. 2.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
82. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 1, 2.
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More importantly, the argument misapprehends the effect of the
Seventeenth Amendment on the Constitution's prescribed bicameral-
ism. The institutional safeguards of bicameralism need not derive from
a difference in the manner in which the two bodies are elected.Y To
the extent that the bicameralism of the national legislature originally
rested on such a distinction, the Seventeenth Amendment removes it.
Yet a host of other dissimilarities, such as the longer term for Senators,
remain to ensure the "differences in the composition and complexion
of the two bodies" that bicameralism requires.
83. Only those states currently represented by less than three House members would
have Senate districts of equal or smaller constituencies than House members. In such
instances, Senate districts may not be appropriate. Nothing in the Elections Clause, how-
ever, requires that each state's Senate elections be held in the same manner. See Joel F.
Paschal, The House of Representatives: "Grand Depository of the Democratic Principle"?
17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 276, 285-86 (1952) (noting that Congress may exercise its
power under the Elections Clause with respect to a single state).
84. See Max Farrand, Popular Election of Senators, 2 YALE REV. (n.s.) 234, 241
(1913) [hereinafter Farrand, Popular Election]. Farrand writes:
It was the evident intention of the Federal Convention to establish in the Senate
a body of a distinctly different character from that of the House of Representa-
tives. The manner of election was only one method of differentiating the two.
Differences in number, in term of office, in age, and, at one stage of the pro-
ceedings, in other qualifications as well, were all important distinctions. In the
judgment of the writer there is nothing inherently contrary to the purposes of
the founders of our government in permitting the Senators of the United States
to be chosen by the people instead of by the legislatures of the individual States.
It would seem to be a question of policy and expediency rather than of principle.
Id.; accord Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 576-77 (1964). In Reynolds, the State argued
that applying the one man, one vote criterion to both the state house of representatives
and the senate would defeat the essential purposes of bicameralism by treating the two
bodies the same. See id. at 576. The Court clearly distinguished the concept of bicam-
eralism from the procedures employed to elect a legislative body:
A prime reason for bicameralism, modernly considered, is to insure mature and
deliberate consideration of, and to prevent precipitate action on, proposed leg-
islative measures. Simply because the controlling criterion for apportioning
representation is required to be the same in both houses does not mean that
there will be no differences in the composition and complexion of the two bod-
ies.
Id.
85. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 576. If requiring the same apportionment criteria for an
upper house and a lower house in Reynolds does not eviscerate the institutional safe-
guards of bicameralism, then permitting Senators to be elected by districts would leave
bicameralism intact as well. The bicameralism prescribed by the Constitution would be
undisturbed by Senate districts because the specific and distinct powers given to each
body would remain unchanged, and each body would retain the right to determine its own
procedural rules. These remaining distinctions, in conjunction with the fact that Senate
districts would in most cases be larger than House districts, ensure that there will be the
"differences in the composition and complexion of the two bodies" that bicameralism
contemplates. Id.
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In sum, neither Article V nor the Constitution's provision for a bi-
cameral national legislature contradicts the support for federal Senate
districts found in the Elections Clause of Article I, Section 4; the Quali-
fications Clause of the Seventeenth Amendment; and the Tenth
Amendment. All of these provisions can be harmonized in a manner
that makes sense of the entirety of the Constitution and permits Senate
districts.
II. THE PRE-SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT SENATE
In order to comprehend the changes wrought by the Seventeenth
Amendment and interpret how those changes support the creation of
federal Senate districts, one must first understand why the original
Constitution prescribed the legislative appointment of Senators. The
raison d'etre of the Senate was anything but clear to the Framers. Af-
ter setting forth the concerns that weighed on the Framers as they
gathered in Philadelphia in 1787, Part II presents the cacophonous ra-
tionales that were offered for creating the upper house of the national
legislature. The most widely known theory of the Senate-the notion
that it was to represent states in their political capacity-was not a uni-
versal belief at the time of the Constitutional Convention, and in fact,
was flatly contradicted during the ratification struggle. Although some
of the Founders did indeed intend that the Senate represent states'
sovereign interests, at the time of the Constitution's ratification, the
Senate was understood mainly as a popular representative body whose
function was to act as a check on the House.
Part II concludes by describing two post-ratification practices
which support the permissibility of Senate districts under the original
Constitution. First, some state legislatures did in fact elect Senators by
district. Thus, whether or not the Senate represented states' sovereign
interests, Senate districts were viewed as permissible. Second, many
states effectively disregarded the Constitution's requirement that their
legislatures appoint Senators. Instead, popular primaries and other
mechanisms were used to ascertain the public's choice for the office,
and state legislatures often deferred to these polls. For all the near-
folkloric distinctions between the representative capacities of the Sen-
ate and the House, these practices suggest that the two bodies shared a
popular democratic genesis.
A. Concerns of the Framers
As a nascent republic newly freed from the shackles of an unrep-
resentative British government, post-Revolutionary America's
understanding of democracy was rich and fast-evolving. A central
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animating principle of the Revolution had been elegantly simple: gov-
ernment's legitimacy must be based on the consent of the governed.-
This manifesto, however, was more easily conceptualized in revolt than
implemented in practice. As the premise of the Revolution, democ-
racy was understood as a bulwark against a tyrannical British King and
Parliament.Y7 Only after the Revolution, during the Critical Period of
the 1780's, would the nation come to fully understand that tyranny
could also be practiced by democratically elected assembliesYs
There was every indication in the early 1780's that the revolution-
aries had underestimated the indiscriminate nature of power: "The
people, it seemed, were as capable of despotism as any prince; public
liberty was no guarantee after all of private liberty." 9 The state legisla-
tures created by the revolutionary state constitutions were microcosmic
vehicles for the peoples' excesses. As the grist mills for democratic
tyranny, these bodies confiscated private property, aided paper money
schemes, and enacted debtor relief legislation and ex post facto laws
that penalized commercial interests." "The economic and social insta-
bility engendered by the Revolution was finding political expression in
the state legislatures at the very time they were larger, more represen-
tative, and more powerful than ever before in American history."91
There was growing sentiment in the mid-1780's that unwieldy state
legislatures posed a greater threat to America's republican experiment
than the acknowledged inadequacies of the Articles of Confederation.
92
Thus, by 1786, reform efforts had shifted from the states to the central
government." "The calling of the Philadelphia Convention in 1787,"
writes Gordon Wood, "was the climax of the process of rethinking that
had begun with the reformation of the state constitutions in the late
seventies and early eighties, a final step taken from the fullest convic-
tion that there was not a better, perhaps no other, which could be
adopted in this crisis of our public affairs." 4
86. See GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787,
at 441 (1969).
87. See id. at 409.
88. See id. at 409-10.
89. Id. at 410.
90. See id. at 404-06.
91. Id. at 405.
92. See id. at 466-67.
93. See id. at 466.
94. Id. at 467 (internal quotation omitted).
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B. The Uncertain Function of the Senate
The Great Compromise is the watershed moment when the small
states prevailed upon the Constitutional Convention to permit equal
representation of the states in the Senate, as had been the method of
apportionment in the Continental Congress.95 Born of the small states'
fear of proportional representation,9 6 the Compromise has often been
misunderstood as being a debate not only about how representation
among the states would be apportioned in the Senate but also about
how Senators were to be selected.Y Yet the concerns that culminated
in the Great Compromise were a far cry from those that led to the leg-
islative appointment of Senators.98 And if the Great Compromise
saved the Convention from the brink of disintegration,99 the issue of
how Senators were to be elected was, by comparison, a relatively un-
controversial topic.'00 Far from being a conscious undertaking, then,
the intersection of the Compromise with the method of electing Sena-
tors was a collision of two trains that the delegates to the Convention
had initially intended to run on separate tracks.101
The Framers convened in Philadelphia on May 25, 1787.'02 The
question of how Senators would be selected was discussed principally
on three days-May 31, June 7, and June 12-and was finally settled on
June 25.'03 By contrast, the equal representation of the states in the
Senate, the core of the Great Compromise, was not decided until July
16.'0' Yet the subtext for all the discussions concerning the Senate was
95. 1 GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 4-10 (1960)
[hereinafter SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES].
96. See Jack Rakove, The Great Compromise.: Ideas, Interests, and the Politics of Con-
stitution Making, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 424, 434 (1987) ("[The small states'] professed fear
was that the relative reduction of their representation would expose them to the rapacious
impulses of a putative coalition of the large states.").
97. See MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 112 (1913) [hereinafter FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION] ("[W]hatever opinions
were expressed in debate, and whatever arguments were advanced for or against the elec-
tion of the members of the upper house by the state legislatures ... they should be
interpreted with reference to the one question at issue, that of proportional representa-
tion.").
98. See 1 SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 95, at 13.
99. See 1 id. at 6-9.
100. See 1 id. at 10.
101. See, eg., Rakove, supra note 96, at 456 (discussing James Madison's failed attempt
to disentangle the question of the legislative appointment of Senators from the issue of ap-
portionment).
102. See 1 RECORDS OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 2.
103. See 1 SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 95, at 10.
104. See FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUnTON, supra note 97, at 104; WILLIAM M. MEIGS,
THE GROWTH OF THE CONSTITUTION IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 57
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the issue of apportionment of representation. 5
In discussing the composition of the national legislature, it was
understood by almost everyone that the legislature would be bicam-
eral, and a resolution to this effect was adopted."6 The overriding
question with respect to the method of election was what role the peo-
ple would assume in selecting members to the national legislature. A
common mistrust of democracy engendered by populist excesses put in
question whether the people were to be involved at all.
The Framers first discussed the manner in which House members
should be selected.'O° There was sentiment that the House of Repre-
sentatives should be appointed by state legislatures, for, as Roger
Sherman of Connecticut argued, "[t]he people ... should have as little
to do as may be about the Government. They want information and
are constantly liable to be misled."''18 But the proposal for popular
election of House members prevailed, with most delegates appearing
to side with James Madison's argument that too many "successive fil-
trations," limiting the direct participation of the people, could be taken
to an extreme; "the people would be lost sight of altogether; and the
necessary sympathy between them and their rulers and officers, too
little felt."' Although he did not express it at the time, Madison also
believed that the popular election of the House was necessary to secure
the superiority of the national government above the states. In order
to successfully subordinate the states, the national overnment would
have to be an ostensibly representative government. 1
The Framers' decision to popularly elect House members fore-
shadowed their rejection of the popular election of Senators. Having
ceded to the people the lower house, the Framers were ever cognizant
that "the general object was to provide a cure for the evils under which
the U.S. laboured... and that a good Senate seemed most likely to an-
swer the purpose."12  Hence, when James Wilson of Pennsylvania
proposed that Senators be elected directly by the people, no state dele-
(1987); 2 RECORDS OFTHE CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 15-16.
105. See FRAMING OFTHE CONSTITUTiON, supra note 97, at 111.
106. Most of the states had bicameral legislatures, and this was the British experience
as well. See GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE ELECTION OF SENATORS 2 n.1 (Ralph C. Ring-
walt ed., 1906) [hereinafter ELECTION OF SENATORS]. Hence, only Pennsylvania voted
against bicameralism. See 1 RECORDS OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 47.
107. See 1 RECORDS OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 48.
108. 1 id.
109. 1 id. at 49-50.
110. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE 271 (1988).
111. See id.
112. 1 RECORDS OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 51.
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gation except his own favored the proposal."' The conventioneers
were not persuaded by Wilson's view that "[i]f one branch of [the na-
tional legislature] ... be chosen by the [state] Legislatures, and the
other by the people, the two branches will rest on different founda-
tions, and dissentions will naturally arise between them.""
4
Dissension between the House and the Senate was exactly what
the Framers desired. The Senate would serve as a check in favor of the
commercial and monied interests, whose lot had not fared well in the
hands of state legislatures beholden to the democratic impulses of the
people. The protection of these "minority" interests and the ques-
tion of the mode of election were inextricably linked. James Madison
reminded the delegates that "[d]ebtors have defrauded their creditors.
The landed interest has borne hard on the mercantile interest. The
Holders of one species of property have thrown disproportion of taxes
on the holders of another species.""' 6 It was incumbent on the dele-
gates, Madison concluded, "to frame a republican system on such a
scale & in such a form as will controul all the evils which have been ex-
perienced.""17 The Senate, according to Madison, could fulfill that
function."'
In the eyes of some delegates, the Senate's pedigree was to differ
from the House's and this distinction would affect its operation. It
would function "with more coolness, with more system, and with more
wisdom, than the popular branch,""' 9 for its members would be drawn
from an elite cadre of men. 2° Since state legislatures were composed
of "select bodies of men," they would appoint Senators reflecting the
same qualities. 2' John Dickinson of Delaware believed that the Senate
should emulate the House of Lords.'2 Alexander Hamilton of New
York proposed a "senate for life."'' 3
Finally, and most important to an understanding of the relation-
113. See 1 id. at 151-55. Wilson's plan called for the popular election of Senators
through large districts that would have apparently clustered states into regions for this
purpose. See 1 id.
114. 1 id. at 151.
115. See 1 id. at 152,154.
116. 1 id. at 135-36.
117. 1 id. at 136.
118. See Iid. at 422-23.
119. WOOD, supra note 86, at 553.
120. See id.
121. THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, at 172 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
122. See 1 RECORDS OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 150.
123. WOOD, supra note 86, at 554.
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ship between the Great Compromise and the legislative appointment
of Senators, the Senate would secure for the states a defense against
the national government.'2 4 Although the democratic excesses of the
states had convinced virtually all of the Convention delegates that
some steps must be taken to strengthen the Articles of Confederation,
there were vastly different views over the extent of any modifications.
Nationalists such as Madison came to the Convention of 1787 with the
expectation of substantially subordinating the state governments. 2'
The nationalists originally sought a largely consolidated central gov-
ernment in which the notion of state sovereignty had little role.
12 6
Federalism, the notion of shared sovereignty, evolved from the Con-
vention only as a compromise. 7
Precisely how state sovereignty emerged as a rationale for the
legislative appointment of Senators, and, more to the point, how the
legislative appointment of Senators came to intersect with the crux of
the Great Compromise, is a complex history. The notion of two meth-
ods of representation-the House representing the people and the
Senate the states-was alluded to on the very first day that the dele-
gates took up the subject of representation, well in advance of the
Great Compromise."2 During the discussions concerning the method
of electing Senators, delegates from both large and small states in-
voked state sovereignty as a justification for the legislative
appointment of Senators. John Dickinson of Delaware supported the
legislative appointment of Senators because
the sense of the States would be better collected through
their Governments .... The preservation of the States in a
certain degree of agency is indispensable. It will produce
that collision between the different authorities which should
be wished for in order to check each other. To attempt to
abolish the States altogether, would degrade the Councils of
our Country, would be impracticable, would be ruinous.
On this score, Dickinson's view was buttressed by Charles Pinckney of
South Carolina, who conceded that "it will be right to shew the sover-
eignty of the State in one branch of the Legislature, and that should be
in the Senate."' 13
124. See 1 RECORDS OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 59, 155.
125. See WOOD, supra note 86, at 525.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 525-26.
128. See FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 97, at 107.
129. 1 REcoRDs OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 150-53.
130. 1 id. at 59.
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Madison would later write:
It must be kept in view that the largest States particularly
Pennsylvania & Virginia always considered the choice of the
2d Branch by the State Legislatures as opposed to a propor-
tional Representation to which they were attached as a
fundamental principle of just Government. The smaller
States who had opposite views, were reinforced by the
members from the large States most anxious to secure the
importance of the State Government.
131
Thus, at least by Madison's account, the large states had lost the battle
over proportional representation in the Senate well before the Great
Compromise; that question had been decided by the Convention's ear-
lier decision giving state legislatures authority to appoint federal
Senators.'3 2
But why did Madison believe that "an election by the State Legis-
latures involved a surrender of the principle insisted on by the large
States and dreaded by the small ones, namely that of a proportional
representation in the Senate?"13 Although he cautioned the delegates
of this consequence during the discussions of the method of appointing
Senators, he did not offer any explanation.TM  Likewise, when Rufus
King of Massachusetts issued this same admonition to the delegates, he
did not explain why the legislative appointment of Senators necessarily
subverted proportional representation, nor did his observation prompt
inquiry.35 On the face of it, there seems no logical or practical im-
pediment to both legislatively electing Senators and apportioning
representation among the several states. Yet the dilemma that Madi-
son foresaw lay not in logic or practical concerns, but in the eighteenth
century dichotomy of states' sovereign rights versus the rights of the
116people. Federalists such as Madison and Wilson believed that com-plete proportional representation in the national legislature would
131. 1 id. at 408.
132. See Rakove, supra note 96, at 456. According to Jack Rakove:
[r]he vote [of June 7] revealed that legislative election of senators, for all its
faults, was preferred by a decisive majority of the convention. From that point
on, Madison found himself having to hope either that the damage could be lim-
ited without jeopardizing the cause of proportional representation or that an
eventual victory on apportionment could be used to reverse the decision on elec-
tion. But once the specter of sectional conflict legitimated the small states'
appeal to security, that opportunity was lost.
Id
133. FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 97, at 111.
134. See 1 RECORDS OFTHE CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 151.
135. See 1 id. at 51.
136. See infra notes 137-38,141-51 and accompanying text.
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obliterate any notion of state sovereignty in the Constitution.137 How-
ever, once states' rights were recognized in the Constitution in any
form, one state could not have greater rights than another by virtue of
its population, for the very idea of state sovereignty existed independ-
ently of a state's relative size.1'
C. Fictions Laid Bare
However intelligibly one may chronicle the story of the Senate's
creation during the Convention, the conception of that body was any-
thing but coherent in the Framers' minds by the end of the
Philadelphia meeting. For each rationale that underpinned the Senate
and its legislative election, an opposing view laid bare a fiction.
Although many delegates looked to the legislative appointment of
Senators to curtail the democratic excesses that had brought the Con-
federation to the brink of extinction, the assumption that this could be
achieved by conferring appointment powers on state legislatures faced
serious doubt. Wilson, the main proponent of the popular election of
Senators, considered how it was possible that
the landed interest wd. be rendered less predominant in the
Senate, by an election through the medium of the Legisla-
tures than by the people themselves. If the Legislatures, as
was now complained, sacrificed the commercial to the
landed interest, what reason was there to expect such a
choice from them as would defeat their own views[?. 39
Madison, whose notion of "successive filtrations" to restrain de-
mocracy was seemingly consonant with the idea of legislative
appointment, also questioned the efficacy of this device:
The great evils complained of were that the State Legisla-
tures run into schemes of paper money &c, whenever
solicited by the people, & sometimes without even the sanc-
tion of the people. Their influence then, instead of checking
a like propensity in the National Legislature, may be ex-
pected to promote it. Nothing can be more contradictory
than to say that the Natl. Legislature with[out] a proper
check will follow the example of the State legislatures, & in
the same breath, that the State Legislatures are the only
proper check.' 4'
Thus, the use of democratic state assemblies to check the very excesses
137. See WOOD, supra note 86, at 525-26.
138. See infra notes 141-51 and accompanying text.
139. 1 REcORDs OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 154.
140. 1 id.
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that they had helped to create reeked of fiction.
But the delegates were most disunited when it came to the idea of
the Senate representing states as such in the national government. To
the nationalists, the notion of state sovereignty elevated form over sub-
stance. Wilson remarked, "Can we forget for whom we are forming a
Government? Is it for men, or for the imaginary beings called States?
Will our honest Constituents be satisfied with metaphysical distinc-
tions? ... We talk of States, till we forget what they are composed
of."'141 Alexander Hamilton, too, thought the distinction between the
people's power and the rights of the states was disingenuous. He in-
veighed, "[A]s States are a collection of individual men which ought we
to respect most, the rights of the people composing them, or of the arti-
ficial beings resulting from the composition[?] Nothing could be more
preposterous or absurd than to sacrifice the former to the latter."1 42
Madison and Gerry premised their arguments against state sovereignty
on history, contending that the states had never possessed the essential
characteristics of sovereignty; these rights instead had been vested in
the Continental Congress.'4'
Although the Great Compromise was a recognition of a residual
aspect of state sovereignty that the nationalists had fought against,
144
that recognition itself was inconsistent with basic features"of the Sen-
ate. For one thing, the Convention had decided that Senators should
vote per capita rather than by state. This method of voting differed
from the Continental Congress in which the delegates did not vote in-
dividually (or per capita) but rather as a state. Voicing a concern
shared by other delegates of small states, Luther Martin of Maryland
objected that the decision to permit each Senator one vote undermined
state sovereignty; this feature remained nevertheless. 46 Moreover, al-
141. 1 id. at 483.
142. 1 id. at 466.
143. See 1 id. at 467,471.
144. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 255 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
("The Senate ... will derive its powers from the States, as political and co-equal societies
.... "); id. No. 43, at 296 ("[Tjhe equality of suffrage in the Senate was probably meant as
a palladium to the residuary sovereignty of the States, implied and secured by ... one
branch of the Legislature ... ."); id. No. 62, at 417 ("[T]he equal vote allowed to each
state, is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the
individual states, and an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty.").
145. See U.S. ARTICLEs OF CONFEDERATION art. V ("[E]ach State shall have one
vote."). Even at the Philadelphia Convention votes were cast as states rather than as
individual delegates. See FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 97, at 57.
146. See 2 RECORDS OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 2, at 94-95; Farrand, Popular
Election, supra note 84, at 238-39 ("When the great compromise was adopted, many...
thought that voting in the upper house would be by States; but having won their main
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though state legislatures had the authority to appoint Senators to rep-
resent the states' corporate interests, there was no provision in the new
Constitution for the recall of Senators should they fail to satisfy their
electors. A right of recall had existed under the Articles of Confedera-
tion.'4'
Nor was there any provision to enable the state legislatures to in-
struct Senators how to vote.'4 While state legislatures might attempt
to instruct Senators, exacting compliance was another matter alto-
gether. A state legislature could refuse to re-elect an errant Senator,
but the Senator's lengthy term of office-six years-rendered this
punishment ineffective.
149
Max Farrand, the editor of the modem chronicles of the Constitu-
tional Convention, helped to explain the foregoing inconsistencies
when he observed:
There was undoubtedly a feeling in the Convention that the
Senate was representative of the States, as contrasted with
the House as representative of the people. This was often
expressed in the form that the lower house represented the
people of the States in their individual capacity, while the
Senate represented the States in their political capacity. But
these should not be regarded as expressions of purposes to be
fulfilled in the composition of the two houses[;] they are al-
most always after-explanations of an accomplished fact."0
Confronted with a confluence of diametrically opposed views and
transparently weak theories, the Convention was never certain of what
the Senate's function would be. This uncertainty would manifest itself
later during the ratification debates.'
contention of equality of representation, there was little objection to allowing Senators to
vote individually, and a provision to that effect was adopted.").
The delegates apparently determined that the inconveniences and delays incident to
voting as states under the Articles of Confederation outweighed any inconsistency be-
tween state sovereignty and individual voting. See Farrand, Popular Election, supra note
84, at 238-39.
147. See U.S. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. V ("[A] power [is] reserved to each
State, to recall its delegates .... ).
148. In contrast, because the Articles of Confederation contained a provision for re-
call, state legislatures by implication had the authority to instruct their representatives
how to vote. See icL
149. See Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1508
(1994). The practice of instructing Senators was never terribly successful and by 1860 had
little significance. See id. By then members of both the House and the Senate appeared
to adhere to the view that they possessed something of a property right in their seats. See
2 SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 95, at 1029.
150. Farrand, Popular Election, supra note 84, at 239 (emphasis added).
151. See WOOD, supra note 86, at 557.
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D. The Ratification Debates: The Selling of the Senate
The provision for the legislative appointment of Senators pro-
voked little controversy during the Constitution's ratification process.1
What is more, the state ratifying conventions largely relented without
protest to the equal representation of the states in the Senate.1'5 Yet,
just as the function of the Senate had not been clear to the delegates in
Philadelphia, so too was its role muddled during the ratification de-
bates. This ambiguity ultimately worked to the benefit of the
Federalists, who artfully exploited the nebulous image of the upper
house to defuse some of the broader criticisms of the proposed Consti-
tution.'M However, the costs of the Federalists' manipulation was a
lingering indeterminacy about the nature of the Senate.
In order to rebut the Anti-Federalists' charge that they sought a
consolidation of the states, the Federalists actively co-opted the prem-
ise of the Great Compromise that the Senate should represent states as
such.'5 With the states represented in their political capacities, the na-
tional government could not possibly extinguish them. On the other
hand, in order to meet the Anti-Federalists' objection that two law-
making authorities could not coexist within the same state without im-
ploding the idea of sovereignty, the Federalists were forced to argue
that all branches of the national government, including the Senate, rep-
resented the people.'5 To understand the dichotomous, contradictory
nature of these arguments, it is necessary to probe the concept of sov-
ereignty.
The references to state sovereignty during the Philadelphia Con-
vention and the ratification debates must be placed in accurate
historical context. Sovereignty was the animating principle of the
American Revolution.'58 It held that "in all civil states it is necessary,
there should somewhere be lodged a supreme power over the
whole."'59 Sovereign power was, by its very nature, indivisible, "for
otherwise, there could be no supremacy, or subordination, that is no
152. See 1 SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 95, at 31.
153. See 1 Id. at 30.
154. See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
155. See WOOD, supra note 86, at558.
156. See id.; THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 55 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961) ("The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the State
Governments, makes them constituent parts of the national sovereignty by allowing them
a direct representation in the Senate .. .
157. See WOOD, supra note 86, at 530.
158. See id. at 345.
159. Id. (quotations omitted).
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government at all."' In Great Britain, sovereignty resided in the Par-
liament, the whole of the nation nominally being represented there.
16 1
The British Empire had initially attempted to justify its exercise of sov-
ereign power over the colonies by claiming that colonists were
"virtually represented" in Parliament. That is to say, though the colo-
nists could not vote for members to Parliament, the commonality of
interests between the colonists, the voting segment of British society,
and the members of Parliament ensured that the colonists were ade-
quately represented." The colonists, however, easily showed that
virtual representation had no application to them.1 6 Thus, the British
were forced to rely on sovereignty and its indivisible nature to defend
their rule over the colonies.' 64
Try as they may, the colonists could not divide sovereignty;' they
could not be subject to the control of the British Parliament for some
purposes but not for others. "'There is no alternative,'" wrote one
Revolutionary, "'either the Colonies are part of the community of
Great Britain or they are in a state of nature with respect to her, and in
no case can be subject to the jurisdiction of that legislative power which
represents her community, which is the British Parliament.' "'65 Thus,
rather than persist in arguments about dividing sovereignty, the Revo-
lutionaries conceded that two supreme authorities could not exist in
the same state and concluded that sovereignty resided, at least transi-
tionally, in their provincial legislatures rather than Parliament.166
In actuality, the transferal of sovereignty from Great Britain to its
former colonies was not as simple as moving law-making authority
from the British Parliament to the provincial legislatures. The fault
lines were numerous. 67 Massachusetts' and New Hampshire's at-
tempts to establish post-colonial legislatures were met with armed
resistance and declarations that Great Britain's dissolution of power
over the colonies had placed the citizens thereof in a state of nature.
1 68
This was an extension of the Lockean principle that a sovereign's
160. Id. (quotations omitted).
161. See id. at 347.
162. See id. at 174-75.
163. See id. at 177-78.
164. See id. at 348-49.
165. Id. at 350 (citation omitted).
166. See id. at 351-52.
167. But see FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 147 (1985) (indicating that for the citizens of Rhode Is-
land and Connecticut, the transfer of sovereignty was indeed a successful transfer of power
to the state legislatures; their governments continued to function without interruption).
168. See id. at 148.
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(Great Britain's) betrayal of its people places its citizens at war with
their ruler and casts them into a "state of nature," in which all previous
laws are nullified.6 9 Given the prevailing ideology, Massachusetts was
forced to call a popularly elected convention in order to draft a consti-
tution, which it ratified belatedly in town meetings in 1780.170 New
Hampshire followed the same procedure and did not ratify its constitu-
tion until 1784.171
Nationalists believed that sovereignty had been relocated in the
Continental Congress.172 Still others believed sovereignty lay with the
individual states. Under this conception, states continued to exist as
political societies but were in a state of nature with respect to each
other.
174
In sum, the location of sovereignty was not definitively established
in the years immediately following the Revolution, but Americans un-
derstood what was thought to be sovereignty's essential
characteristic-its indivisibility:' 75
Despite the original contributions to political thought in the
1760's made by the Americans and despite their long expe-
rience with different spheres of authority, there was in 1776
little theoretical comprehension among most Whig leaders
of any possibility of a divided sovereignty, of any possibility,
in other words, of two legislatures' existing in the same
state.176
Americans' acceptance of the notion of indivisible sovereignty
would later pose a barrier to the creation of a national government. If
sovereignty were indivisible, how could a national and state govern-
ment exercise concurrent powers of taxation? Was it not the design of
the Framers to abolish states altogether, asked the Anti-Federalists?
Gordon Wood writes:
The same logic that the English had used against the Ameri-
cans in the late sixties and that most Americans had finally
accepted in 1774-75 was now relentlessly thrown back at the
Federalists by the opponents of the Constitution. There
could be but one supreme legislative power in every state,
169. Id. at 59, 144.
170. See id. at 149.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 150.
174. See id.
175. See WOOD, supra note 86, at 353.
176. Id.
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the Antifederalists said over and over, and any proposition
to the contrary was inconsistent with the best political sci-
ence of the day.
in
The Federalists ultimately answered their opponents not by di-
viding sovereignty, but by redefining it.178 Wilson, who had mocked the
notion of state sovereignty at the Philadelphia Convention as obscuring
the interests it protected, became the architect of the redefinition of
sovereignty. Wilson did not contest the proposition that there must be
an absolute and supreme authority in all governments, the very essence
of the concept of sovereignty. Noting that some Americans believed
that this supreme authority rested in their state governments, Wilson
maintained that this was a misplacement of sovereignty. 79 "[I]n truth,"
Wilson contended, "[sovereignty] remains and flourishes with the peo-
ple .... It resides in the PEOPLE, as the fountain of government."'o
Under this conception of sovereignty, the people were free to divide
and distribute their sovereign powers as they saw fit, apportioning
some to the national government and others to the states. A state
legislature could not claim to lose its sovereignty; it never possessedit.
The popular sovereignty advanced by Wilson and other Federal-
ists was in many respects as fictional as the notion of a state possessing
rights. At its core, sovereign power was the power to legislate.'3 In the
daily operations of a state, the people could not exercise sovereign
power, though they might do so in "rare moments of revolution."
The experience of the Confederation immediately following the
Revolution amply demonstrated the incompatibility of literal popular
sovereignty with the practicalities of government. The lack of repre-
sentation in the British Parliament and Crown that had aroused
Americans to arms in 1776 had also created a lasting suspicion about
representative government in general.' 8  In many communities
throughout America, conventions of the people at-large, and even
mobs, endeavored to do the work of state legislatures.'16 Even where
177. Id. at 527.
178. See id. at 530.
179. See id.
180. Id.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 531.
183. See id. at 346.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 363.
186. See id. at 368.
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the legislatures took action, "[n]ot only were the people ignoring and
disobeying the laws.., but the lawmakers in the legislatures were be-
ing bandied about and intimidated by electoral combinations and
instructions in their local districts."' The popular sovereignty that
gave birth to the American Revolution was being turned on its head,
for "[t]he dissolution of the ordinary legislatures and the continued ap-
peals to alternative bodies and to the nebulous will of the people in a
state of nature rendered all institutions set above the people precarious
and made representation itself suspect."' 8
Wilson's appeals to the sovereignty of the people during the ratifi-
cation struggle clearly were not a call to return to the "state of nature."
Rather, from the premise that "the supreme or sovereign power of the
society resides in the citizens at large,"' 9 Wilson concluded that the
people could create a government in which they could dispense as
much or as little of their collective sovereignty as they pleased, on
whatever conditions they pleased, and for whatever duration they
pleased.' 9 The argument possessed the dual attributes of making sense
of federalism at a time when sovereignty was thought to be indivisible
while affirming a basic tenet of the Revolution.
9
'
The Federalists' relocation of sovereignty effectively negated the
recognition of states in the national government through the legislative
appointment of Senators. The legislative appointment of federal Sena-
tors was not a mechanism for representing state legislatures in the
Senate, for these entities did not in reality possess sovereign powers-
only the people did. Wood concludes that "[m]ost Federalists ...
stressed that the Senate was as 'nearly a popular representative' of the
people as the lower house, an argument that was comprehensible only
because of the Federalists' equating of all popularly delegated
power.'"'2 Once all sovereignty was relocated in the people, they
could, in the absence of a proscription in the text of the Constitution,
determine how they would be represented in the Senate, whether at-
large or by districts.
But if the Senate would be, in effect, a glorified I-ouse of Repre-
sentatives, what was the rationale for its existence? On this point the
Federalists did not obfuscate: "Bicameralism was ... defended as sim-
187. Id. at 369.
188. Id. at 365.
189. 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 14 (James D. Andrews ed., Chicago, Callaghan
1896).
190. See 1 id. at 167-70.
191. SeeMORGAN, supra note 110, at 58-59,256.
192. WOOD, supra note 86, at 560.
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ply another means of restraining and separating political power."1"
Just as the legislative branch acted as a check on the executive, the two
bodies of the national legislature would act as a check on each other.'
4
E. Post-Ratification Practices: Districting and Limited Popular
Control
Two post-ratification practices support the permissibility of Senate
districts under the original Constitution.'95 The most direct evidence of
their permissibility is states' actual use of such districts. In the initial
decades of the national legislature's existence and as late as 1912, dis-
tricting was not limited to the election of House members. State
legislatures, either by custom or by statute, elected Senators by district.
193. Id. at 559.
194. Madison amplified this point in Federalist No. 62:
It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a less degree
than to other governments, that those who administer it, may forget their obliga-
tions to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to their important trust. In this
point of view, a senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct
from, and dividing the power with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check
on the government. It doubles the security to the people, by requiring the con-
currence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the
ambition or corruption of one, would otherwise be sufficient. This is a precau-
tion founded on such clear principles, and now so well understood in the United
States, that it would be more than superfluous to enlarge on it. I will barely re-
mark that as the improbability of sinister combinations will be in proportion to
the dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies; it must be politic to distinguish
them from each other by every circumstance which will consist with a due har-
mony in all proper measures, and with the genuine principles of republican
government.
TH FEDERALIST No. 62, at 418 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
As Federalist No. 62 makes clear, the benefits of bicameralism were to be attained
not merely by creating a second legislative body but by creating meaningful distinctions
between the two houses. Because the Seventeenth Amendment removed the difference
in constituencies between the House and the Senate, Federalist No. 62 is at odds with the
intent of the Seventeenth Amendment, and thus, one must synthesize the Amendment's
legislative history and the original Framers' notion of bicameralism. See infra notes 335-
64 and accompanying text. "Synthesis ... describes how later texts come to affect the
meaning of earlier texts. Within a tradition of written constitutions, a question of synthe-
sis gets raised with every amendment." Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed
Reading: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REv. 395,408 (1995) (footnote omitted).
195. Ordinarily, post-ratification history is the least probative source of original intent.
See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.. 541, 553 (1994). As it is used in this section, however, the post-
ratification history of the original Constitution constitutes the pre-enactment understanding
of those responsible for passage of the Seventeenth Amendment. Such history is therefore
an appropriate analytic focus of an original intent inquiry. Cf. id. at 599 ("[W]hen assem-
bling the legislative history of a statute, one normally begins by analyzing the interval before
the statute's enactment, rather than the period after. This principle has even more force
where the statute amends, or supersedes, a prior statute.").
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The State of Maryland, for instance, enacted a law requiring that its
state legislature elect Senators from different parts of the state: "[O]ne
of the senators shall be always an inhabitant of the eastern and the
other of the western shore.',
196
George Haynes, who in the early part of the twentieth century was
the nation's principal authority on the history of the Senate, described
the practices in several states:
[I]n every one of the older States ... there has grown up a
custom of the Constitution, even if it has not found em-
bodiment in positive law. There are understandings which
are always observed, precedents which are always followed.
For example, there is a feeling in most States that the two
senators ought to be residents of different sections of the
State, in order that they may represent it most effectively.
Occasionally this is disregarded-indeed, in recent Con-
gresses the senators from Indiana have been both residents
of the same city; but this is a rare exception. In Vermont,
unvarying precedent requires that one senator shall have re-
sided on the east side of the Green Mountains and the other
on the west side. In all her history as a State it is said that
this custom has never once been violated. Maryland did not
trust her restraints to custom, but, for many years, at-
tempted to bind her legislatures in the choice of senator by
the provisions of statute law. As early as 1809 it was en-
acted: "One of the senators shall always be an inhabitant of
the eastern shore and the other of the western shore."' 97
196. 1809 Md. Laws, ch. 22, § 2. That the Maryland statute required the entire legisla-
ture to vote on Senate nominees does not mean that the state did not employ a districting
scheme. The participation of the full legislature was viewed as a constitutional require-
ment. See STORY, supra note 31, at 256. This view, however, did not mean that districts
could not be created; it meant only that the full legislature must concur on the representa-
tive for a given district. There was nothing extraordinary about such a requirement.
Since 1788 some states had used a similar system for electing its members to Congress-
electors voted statewide but the members came from particular districts. See Jack N.
Rakove, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George Washington, in BEYOND
CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL
IDENTITY 269-70 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987).
197. ELECrION OF SENATORS, supra note 106, at 31. The informal practice of electing
Senators from different regions of a state continues to the present day. Consider, for
example, the 1996 United States Senate contests in Kansas. Kansas has traditionally
elected one Senator from the eastern part of the state and one from the western region.
See Deborah Kalb, Frahm Named Interim Successor to Resigning Sen. Dole, CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 1478, 1479 (May 25, 1996). However, majority leader Robert Dole, who
comes from western Kansas, resigned from the Senate in May to run full-time for the
presidency, and Senator Nancy Kassebaum, who comes from the eastern region of the
state, is retiring from the Senate in 1996. Based on the candidate field for Senators Dole
and Kassebaum's replacements, some Kansas Republicans expressed concern that both of
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Whatever the ambiguity created by the Federalists, states' use of
Senate districts even before the adoption of the Seventeenth Amend-
ment demonstrates that there is no inconsistency between the Senate
representing states' sovereign interests and Senators being elected by
districts. 98 Moreover, it would be an absurd consequence of the popu-
lar election of Senators if districting, which was practiced before the
Seventeenth Amendment, was disallowed after the Amendment's rati-
fication, precisely when the Senate's electoral base became identical to
that of the House of Representatives.
A second post-ratification practice supports the view that the
House and Senate were both conceived primarily as popular represen-
tative bodies, thus making use of districts proper for each.
Notwithstanding the constitutionally prescribed role of state legisla-
tures, the public had a substantial, often decisive, say in the selection of
United States Senators even before ratification of the Seventeenth
Amendment. Although not always successful, as early as 1858, politi-
cal parties were endorsing Senate candidates at party conventions as a
means of exerting public influence over the selection of Senators.' 9 By
1890, several states employed direct primaries to express senatorial
their candidates would come from the western part of the state. See id.
198. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892), forecloses any argument that districting
is inconsistent with the representation of a state as a sovereign whole. Plaintiffs in
McPherson sought to void a Michigan statute providing for the election of the state's
presidential electors by districts. Plaintiffs argued that such a districting scheme was in-
consistent with the command of Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 that "[e]ach State...
appoint a Number of Electors .... " Id. at 24 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2). They
maintained that "the appointment of electors by districts is not an appointment by the
State, because all its citizens otherwise qualified are not permitted to vote for all the
presidential electors." Id. at 24-25.
Comparing Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 to the method of electing Representatives,
the Court noted that most states opted to elect members of the House of Representatives
by district in the early part of the Republic and had been required by federal statute to do
so in 1842. See id at 26 (citing Act of June 25, 1842, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491 (apportioning Rep-
resentatives among the several states according to the Sixth Census)). The Court found
that although the Constitution required that House members be elected "by the people of
the several States," id. at 26, districting was not at variance with the notion of the state
being represented in its sovereign capacity. The Court stated: "It has never been
doubted that representatives in Congress thus chosen represented the entire people of the
state acting in their sovereign capacity." Id. Even though all of the people of the state
are not permitted to vote on each presidential elector or congressman, the Court rea-
soned that, "the combined result is the expression of the voice of the state, a result
reached by direction of the legislature, to whom the whole subject is committed." Id.
The argument is underscored by the Constitution's provision for per capita voting in
the Senate. Because the Constitution affords states two separate and independent votes
in the Senate, each with the potential to nullify the other, Senate districts simply reflect
the reality of how states are represented in the Senate, if they were ever intended to be
represented at all. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
199. See ELECION OF SENATORS, supra note 106, at 133-34.
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preferences to their state legislatures. In de facto single-party states
such as those in the South, the results of the popular primary effec-
tively bound the state legislature.200 Even in jurisdictions not
dominated by single parties, the results of the popular primary were
given coercive effect by various means. For instance, in Oregon, can-
didates for the state legislature were asked to sign a pledge obligating
themselves to vote for the Senate candidate who received the highest
number of votes in the popular primary.21 Although state legislators
were not originally required to sign the pledge, in 1908 Oregon passed
an initiative making signing compulsory.2 2 In the elections of 1910,
most of the legislators failing to sign the pledge were defeated.
201
Although the states' attempts to turn the selection of Senators
over to the people achieved mixed results,2°4 the attempt itself suggests
a fundamental similarity between the House and the Senate. Inasmuch
as the legislative appointment of Senators has been thought to denote a
special role for the states in Congress, the state legislatures' delegation
of their duty to the people suggested that Senators and Representatives
both represent the people. If both bodies were, in effect, elected to
represent the people, then both could be elected by district.
There were, of course, appreciable differences in character be-
tween the House and Senate, and some of those differences may have
been attributable to the Constitution's provision for the legislative ap-
pointment of Senators.20 Indeed, but for the perception that the
legislative appointment of Senators insulated them from the popular
will, there would have been scant reason for the passage of the Seven-
200. See id. at 137-40. Indeed, in South Carolina, state legislatures were required to
take an oath promising to abide by the results of the popular primary. See iL at 148.
201. See ALLEN H. EATON, THE OREGON SYSTEM 92-98 (1912).
202. See id. at 96.
203. See iL at 97.
204. See ELECTION OF SENATORS, supra note 106, at 152 (noting that the efforts at
non-constitutional reform were most successful "in States where one party [was] firmly
intrenched in power, [and] popular control [could] be asserted in the way of anticipating
what would have been the probable action of the legislature").
205. See, e.g., Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An
Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 111,
146 (1993) (noting that state legislatures' power to appoint Senators "made the Senate a
bastion of states-rights supporters and a substantial obstacle to the expansion of the fed-
eral government into the realm of traditional state powers"). The authors, whose
assertion is unsupported by specific examples, probably overstate their case. The Senate
had been intended to be a more conservative, deliberative body, and the legislative ap-
pointment of Senators was but one vehicle for ensuring this. See Farrand, Popular
Election, supra note 84, at 241. Thus, differences between the House and Senate that may
seem attributable to the legislative appointment of the latter are equally attributable to
other characteristics of the Senate, such as the longer term of office.
1996]
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teenth Amendment.206  However, the states' similar treatment of
House and Senate elections by seeking to make their selections based
on popular preference cast considerable doubt on the assumption that
the original intent of the Senate was to represent the sovereign inter-
ests of the states. This conception of the Senate, tenuous to begin with,
was rendered wholly without basis by the ratification of the Seven-
teenth Amendment.
Ill. THE PASSAGE OF THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT
Although the text of the Seventeenth Amendment makes no ref-
erence to race, the provision's legislative history confirms W.E.B.
DuBois's 1908 prophecy: "Theyroblem of the Twentieth Century is
the problem of the color-line.",2  In this section, the Article first ex-
amines the legislative history of the Seventeenth Amendment. Two
facets of this history are remarkable. First, and most astonishing, race
(or, perhaps more accurately, racism) nearly deprived the nation of the
opportunity to directly elect Senators. Second, and relatedly, the na-
tion's racial dilemma forced the Amendment's enactors to recognize
the central ramification of the direct election of Senators for state sov-
ereignty-namely, that with direct elections the Senate could no
longer, if it ever truly did, function as a repository of states' sovereign
interests. Rather, both the House and Senate would represent the sov-
ereignty of the people of the United States. If the people could, as in
the case of the House, allocate their sovereign power among several
districts, they could logically do the same with the Senate.
206. Writing in 1912, before the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, George
Haynes stated:
Gradually ... the feeling has become widespread that many of the men who, in
recent years, have found their way to the Senate, are little disposed to hold
themselves responsible to the people, or to heed the broader interests of the
country. Rightly or wrongly, this imperfect sense of responsibility shown by the
senators is being attributed in increasing measure to the process and organ of
their election; and the same distrust of state legislatures which has led to the
stripping away of many of their powers, through amendments to state constitu-
tions and other forms of direct legislation, now gives rise to the demand that the
choice of senators shall no longer be left to the caprice of these legislatures, but
that it shall either be taken away from them entirely, or, at any rate, be sub-
jected to effective popular control.
ELECTION OF SENATORS, supra note 106, at 131. The traditional view that the direct
election movement resulted from an unrepresentative, corrupt Senate has been chal-
lenged in more modem accounts of the Seventeenth Amendment's ratification. See, e.g.,
HOEBEKE, supra note 9, at 135, 151; Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests: A
Public Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L. REV. 1007, 1019-20
(1994).
207. W.E.B. DuBois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK, at v (1903).
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Section B of Part III translates the original intent of the Seven-
teenth Amendment by identifying three modem political
circumstances which justify Senate districts: (1) the participation of
racial minorities in the political process, (2) the ever-increasing role of
money in political campaigns and its corresponding marginalization of
the average citizen in the political process, and (3) the modem-day uni-
formity in the representational capacities and institutional pressures of
the House and Senate.
A. Eschewing the Merits: Race, State Sovereignty and the
Seventeenth Amendment
"Constitutional professionals"-judges, lawyers and legal acade-
micians-often misstate constitutional history.20 It will come as no
surprise, then, that politicians are prone to do the same when they en-
gage in the process of amending the Constitution. The Seventeenth
Amendment is one of several democratic innovations in government
achieved by the Progressive Movement. Like the advent of the refer-
endum, the initiative, and the recall election, the movement for the
direct election of Senators was predicated, at least ostensibly, on the
view that large concentrations of business, capital and labor had margi-
nalized the voice of the individual citizen in the political process. m9 The
movement was nearly a century old by the time House Joint Resolu-
tion 39 was introduced in the Sixty-second Congress.2 °  The
Resolution's core provision stated: "The Senate of the United States
shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the
people thereof, for six years .... ,,211 To many members of the Sixty-
second Congress, extended debate over the merits of direct electionlong hstory212was obviated by the proposal's long history. But in an effort to soft-
pedal the magnitude of their proposed change, supporters of the
Resolution mischaracterized the history of the Senate in a way that ob-
scured the Amendment's potential ramifications for the representation
of states in the national government.
The authors of the House Report on the Amendment believed
208. See Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modem American Constitutionalism, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 523,524 (1995).
209. See HOEBEKE, supra note 9, at 18.
210. See id. at 162.
211. 47 CONG. REC. 203 (1911) (reading of resolution by the clerk).
212. See, e.g., id. at 1764 (statement of Sen. Works) (declining to discuss the merits of
direct elections because "[t]he record of this question was made up, and well made up, at
the last session of Congress"); id. at 206 (statement of Rep. Young) (declining to discuss
the merits of direct elections because "the sentiment upon that question is overwhelm-
ingly in favor of the proposition on both sides of the Chamber").
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that "[t]he Senators of a State would be just as thoroughly representa-
tive of the State if elected by the people as they are when elected by
the legislature." ' Would the Anti-Federalists who had insisted on the
legislative appointment of Senators as a means of protecting states
agree? Moreover, how was it possible that the House and Senate, each
now to be popularly elected, could nevertheless represent different in-
terests? The legislative appointment of Senators had been the primary
214protection of states in the original Constitution. The authors of the
House Report could not have it both ways: they could not provide for
the direct election of Senators and simultaneously claim that the Sen-
ate would continue to represent states in their political capacity.
The report further stated that after passage of the Amendment,
"It will still be the duty and the pride of the Senator to see that the
Commonwealth which he represents in its entirety has that full repre-
sentation to which it is entitled under the fundamental law. 21 5 The
report ignored the practices of those states which, either by custom or
by statute, used a districting scheme to apportion their representation
in the Senate.21' The authors of the House Report seemed to be re-
writing the very history they purported to preserve.
217
In part because the issue was well-worn, but also because under-
statement (and misstatement) of the Amendment's consequences was
to their advantage, supporters of direct elections in the Sixty-second
Congress largely eschewed the proposed Amendment's ramifications
for state sovereignty. It is thus ironic that another issue that many
viewed as diversionary would ultimately bring state sovereignty to the
fore.
213. H.R. REP. No. 62-2, pt. 6, at 3 (1911).
214. See Kramer, supra note 149, at 1508.
215. H.R. REP. NO. 62-2, pt. 6, at 3.
216. For examples of these customs and statutes, see ELECTION OF SENATORS, supra
note 106, at 31. In any event, there is no inconsistency between Senate districts and the
expectation that a Senator will represent his entire state. See supra note 198. A Senator
elected from Ohio is as much a representative of the entire nation as she is a representa-
tive of Ohio. See infra notes 264-68 and accompanying text. A fortiori, since a Senator
represents both her state and the nation, a Senator from the southern portion of Ohio is
both a representative of her district and the whole state.
217. A final miscue illustrates the premium that the Amendment's supporters placed
on expediency. Although unrelated to the question of Senate districts, to allay fears that
the change in the method of election raised the specter of proportional representation in
the Senate, the report said of the Great Compromise: "Had the fathers seen fit to say
that the Senators should be elected by popular vote the compromise between the large
and the small States would have been precisely the same." H.R. REP. No. 62-2, pt. 5, at 3
(1911). Madison's view, however, casts doubt on this confident assertion: popular elec-
tions would have allowed for proportional representation in the Senate, a result sought by
the Federalists. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
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1. The "Race Rider"
After years of laying dormant in various Senate committees, a
Resolution for the direct election of Senators reached the floor of the
Senate in 1911 during the Sixty-first Congress.2' But the resolution
went beyond merely providing for the direct election of Senators. It
also contained an amendment to the Elections Clause of Article I of
the Constitution. The Elections Clause gave Congress the power to
modify state regulations regarding the time, place and manner of
holding House elections. It gave Congress the same power with re-
spect to the time and manner, but not the place, of holding Senate
elections. The resolution, however, proposed removing all of the
federal government's oversight authority in Senate elections.' It pro-
vided that "[t]he times, places, and manner of holding elections for
Senators shall be as prescribed in each State by the legislature
thereof."22'
Engineered by Southern Democrats who feared Reconstruction-
style federal intervention in Senate elections,2 and later demonized as
a "race rider" by its opponents, M  the proposed amendment to the
Elections Clause provoked a hostile showdown.? Senator George
Sutherland of Utah offered an amendment to rid the direct election
proposal of the so-called race rider and restore the original language of
the Elections Clause.m For this, strangely, he was accused of attempt-
ing to defeat the direct election proposal by injecting the issue of
race.226 Senator William Borah of Idaho, a vigorous advocate of direct
elections who supported the amendment to the Elections Clause as the
price of securing them, could see no other point to the Sutherland
Amendment. 7 Congress, he argued, had no intention of employing
218. See 1 ROBERT C. BYRD, THE SENATE 1789-1989: ADDRESSES ON THE HISTORY
OF THE UNrITED STATES SENATE 398-402 (Mary S. Hall ed., 1988).
219. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
220. See 1 BYRD, supra note 218, at 400.
221. 46 CONG. REC. 847 (1911).
222. See 1 BYRD, supra note 218, at 400.
223. References to this specific characterization are from the 62nd Congress's debate
when an identical amendment to the Elections Clause was proposed in conjunction with
House Joint Resolution 39. However, the reaction of Republican members of the 61st
Congress was of a similar vein. See, e.g., 46 CONG. REC. 2765-66 (1911) (statement of
Sen. Carter) (arguing that without federal supervision of Senate elections under the Elec-
tions Clause, blacks may be deprived of voting rights).
224. See 1 BYRD, supra note 218, at 400.
225. Seelid.
226. See I1d.
227. See I id.
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the Elections Clause to benefit the former slaves, so it was folly to ob-
ject to relinquishing federal control of Senate elections. "Let me say to
the Negro," Borah admonished from the Senate floor, "do not permit
the anxious and restless and hopeful spirit to call you from the path you
are pursuing of working out your own salvation." 2
The debate over the Sutherland Amendment, which lasted six
weeks during the Sixty-first Congress, engendered considerably more
controversy than the core proposal for the direct election of Senators.2 9
This was to the delight of the opponents of direct elections. "Their
strategy was to pass [the Sutherland Amendment], so obnoxious to
many southern senators who otherwise favored direct election, so that
those members would vote against the resolution itself."2'30 The oppo-
nents of direct elections succeeded.23'
The political climate had changed by the Sixty-second Congress.
Although Republicans controlled the Senate by a slim margin, the
232Democrats were solidly in control of the House. Thus, when the
Democratic House reported out House Joint Resolution 39, it con-
tained the distinctive imprimatur of Southern Democrats in the form of
an amendment to the Elections Clause. It provided: "The times,
places, and manner of holding elections for Senators shall be as pre-
scribed in each State by the legislature thereof.2 33 This time it was
228. 1 Id.
229. See Id.
230. 1 Id. at 400-01.
231. See 1 id. at 401.
232. See 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OFTHE CONGRESS, supra note 4, at 1557. In the 61st Con-
gress, Republicans outnumbered Democrats by 219 to 172 in the House and 61 to 32 in
the Senate. See id. In the 62nd Congress, Republicans still held a majority in the Senate
by a 51 to 41 margin; however, the Democrats gained control of the House by a 228 to 161
margin. See id.
233. 47 CONG. REC. 203 (1911) (reading of H.R.J. Res. 39 by the clerk). The Republi-
cans did not hesitate to attribute the worst of motives to Southern Democrats' insistence
that the Elections Clause be amended. They repeatedly referred to the proposal as a
"race rider" because the reason the South wanted to banish federal supervision of Senate
elections was to ensure that the national government would not interfere with its disen-
franchisement of Blacks. See id. at 1483, 1889, 1899 (statements of Sen. Smith). But how
amending the Elections Clause would accomplish disenfranchisement was not at all clear.
Some Republicans foresaw no practical impairment of the federal government's ability to
intervene in Senate elections even if the Elections Clause was amended; they simply pre-
ferred that the proposal for direct elections not be encumbered by tangential matters. See
id. at 1909 (statement of Sen. Bristow).
Others, however, could sense a Machiavellian plot. They suspected that Southern
Democrats were attempting to impliedly repeal the Fifteenth Amendment's prohibition
against racial discrimination at the polls. One Republican purported to pierce the South's
race-neutral facade:
You southern Democrats believe that if you can insert in the Constitution, as
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Senator Joseph Bristow of Kansas who sponsored an amendment ("the
Bristow Amendment") to rid the resolution of the so-called race rider
and to maintain the original language of the Elections Clause.2
Because Democrats sought to justify their proposal on grounds of
you are now proposing, the following provision, "the times, places, and manner
of holding elections for Senators shall be as prescribed in each State by the leg-
islature thereof," that this may be construed as a partial repeal of the fifteenth
amendment, and whether it so operates as a matter of theoretical law, you know
that you intend that it shall operate so in fact.
Id. at 2430 (statement of Rep. Mann).
To other Republicans, the proposed amendment to the Elections Clause was evoca-
tive of the Civil War:
The reasons for this [amendment to the Elections Clause] are not difficult to dis-
cover. One section of this country is still arrayed against the other politically. In
the great civil conflict of 50 years ago they were defeated. They are now in
power in this House. This demand comes chiefly from that section. It is seeking
the same power now that was denied it then-the power of the State to control
the Nation for its own end untrammeled by Federal supervision.
Id. at 2418 (statement of Rep. Moon).
For their part, the Democrats responded to these charges in part by acknowledging
them (whether consciously or unconsciously), and in part by charging the Republicans
with subterfuge. The Reconstruction era, when Republicans forcibly intervened in the
South's elections in order to secure the participation of former slaves, was almost cer-
tainly on the minds of Southern Democrats who supported amending the Elections
Clause. One Democrat recalled the period as one during which "[flederal bayonets fas-
ten[ed] the heel of the negro upon the neck of the white man." IL at 2414 (statement of
Rep. Witherspoon). The Democrats contended that the objective of the Bristow
Amendment, which sought to restore the original language of the Elections Clause, see
infra note 234, was "to overthrow white supremacy and to reinstate negro domination in
the Southern States." 47 CoNG. REc. 2415 (1911) (statement of Rep. Witherspoon).
Given these self-incriminating responses to the Republicans' charges, it was under-
standable that the Republicans could not accept the otherwise reasonable argument that
the Constitution's anti-discrimination provisions would ensure continued federal supervi-
sion of Southern elections even if the Elections Clause were repealed. See, e.g., id at
1764-65 (statement of Sen. Works) (arguing that Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
would continue to protect Blacks even after the repeal of the Elections Clause).
However, the Democrats did not completely play into the Republicans' hands. They
charged that Republicans were engaging in subterfuge, emphasizing the Elections Clause
proposal only because they opposed the principle of direct elections. See, e.g., id at 2420
(statement of Rep. Sherley).
In sum, there was no shortage of the impugning of motives during the debates on the
Seventeenth Amendment. However, in order to understand why the defeat of the pro-
posal to amend the Elections Clause fundamentally undermined the idea of the Senate as
a guardian of state sovereignty, one must go beyond motives and critique the rationales
that Democrats offered in support of their proposal.
234. An identical amendment was offered in the House by Representative Young of
Michigan. See 47 CONG. REc. 207. Young's amendment was defeated in the House. See
id. at 241-42. However, because the Senate adopted the Bristow Amendment and sent
the amended House Joint Resolution 39 back to the House for its concurrence, the Bris-
tow Amendment was debated in the House as well as the Senate. See id. at 2404. Thus,
for simplicity's sake, both the Young and Bristow proposals are referred to throughout as
"the Bristow Amendment."
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state sovereignty, the defeat of the proposed amendment to the Elec-
tions Clause confirms this Article's core thesis that the Senate no
longer represents states' sovereign interests.
2. State Sovereignty in a State of Confusion
Although Byzantine, the Democrats' arguments on behalf of the
proposed amendment to the Elections Clause had an unmistakable
thrust: states' rights.35 The Senate, they claimed repeatedly, repre-
sented states in their sovereign capacity. 3Thus, states, not the federal
government, should have ultimate authority to determine the time,
place and manner of electing Senators.37 Although with the passage of
the Seventeenth Amendment both the House and the Senate would be
elected by the people, an asymmetry in the Elections Clause allowing
federal supervision over the former, but exempting the latter, would be
justified by the unique role of Senators as "ambassadors" of their
states.23 8
Significantly, the state sovereignty whose virtues the Democrats
extolled was different from the state sovereignty that the Anti-
Federalists sought to protect in 1787. The Democrats used the term to
refer to the popular will of the citizens of a particular state.23' By con-
235. The terms "states rights" and "state sovereignty" are often used interchangeably.
Terrence M. Messonnier, A Neo-Federalist Interpretation of the Tenth Amendment, 25
AKRON L. REv. 213, 224 n.65 (1991). However, "[s]tate sovereignty, in its narrowest
sense, is the concept that the states are the source of sovereignty." Id. This was the posi-
tion of the Southern secessionists during the Civil War. See Michael W. McConnell, The
Fourteenth Amendment" A Second American Revolution or the Logical Culmination of the
Tradition?, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1159, 1167 (1992). The state sovereignty doctrine re-
pudiated the notion of a divisible sovereign and advocated a return to the eighteenth
century conception that sovereignty resides in the state governments. See Arthur Bestor,
State Sovereignty and Slavery: A Reinterpretation of Proslavery Constitutional Doctrine,
1846-1860, 54 J. ILL. ST. HIST. SOc'Y 117, 146 (1961). Secession was the most extreme
expression of the doctrine of state sovereignty. See id. at 119. States rights, on the other
hand, is a rhetorical expression of the desire for more limited federal powers. See id. at
144-46.
Although the Democratic supporters of the so-called race rider invoked state sover-
eignty as a justification for their amendment, for the most part, they probably did not
intend to convey its strictest meaning. With this caveat in mind, the Article uses the
terms interchangeably throughout.
236. See, e.g., 48 CONG. REC. 6352 (1912) (statement of Rep. Sisson); 47 CONG. REC.
1488 (1911) (colloquy between Sens. Sutherland and Williams); id. at 2411 (statement of
Rep. Dickinson); id. at 2419 (statement of Rep. Sherley); id. at 2428 (statement of Rep.
Richardson); H.R. REp. NO. 62-2, pt. 6, at 3 (1911).
237. See 47 CONG. REC. 1488 (colloquy between Sens. Sutherland and Williams).
238. See id. at 1886 (statement of Sen. Borah).
239. As Senator Raynor of Maryland put it:
Who do I represent here; my State in its sovereign capacity? Yes. But what is
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trast, the Anti-Federalists had insisted on the legislative appointment
of Senators precisely because they distinguished between representa-
tion of the people (for which the lower house existed) and
representation of the state as a corporate body (for which the Senate
supposedly existed).240 The modem Democrats' redefinition of state
sovereignty not only allowed them to assert that the shift from legisla-
tive to direct elections would not change the nature of the Senate, but
also provided another central tenet for amending the Elections Clause.
The Democrats inveighed:
Reduced to plain language, [the Bristow Amendment's]
declaration is: "Yes, you are a sovereign people,... a peo-
ple that we trust; therefore we will give you the right to vote
for United States Senators... but you neither possess the
honesty nor the intelligence to conduct such an election.
We will therefore not give you the right to select your Sena-
tors clean-cut and clear; we will have Congress put hobbles
upon this right... ,241
The Democrats insisted that the power to elect necessarily included the
power to decide the time, place and manner of election.242
Rather than recognizing the Senate's role as the guardian of state
interests, the Democrats argued, the Bristow Amendment actually en-
larged federal power, even as it purported to leave the Elections
Clause unchanged. 243 The objective of the Bristow Amendment,
Democrats argued, was to "deprive the State of the power to deter-
mine who shall represent it in the Senate, and to give to Congress the
power to determine and select Senators of the Southern States."24
This result, they claimed, obtained because the federal government
could somehow interfere with a state's choice of Senators in a popular
election in a way that it could not if Senators were appointed by state
legislatures. Since state legislators elected Senators, and the federal
government could not interfere with the election of state legislators,
the federal government effectively had no authority in the legislative
my State except the people who compose it. Are the people of the State one
thing and the State another? Then who is the State? ... Is that which has been
rightfully denominated the despotism of the Republic the prevailing sentiment
of this body? Fellow Senators, are we imbued with fear of the people of our
States?
Id. at 1736.
240. See supra notes 124-38,155 and accompanying text.
241. 47 CONG. REC. 1913 (statement of Sen. Reed).
242. See id. at 1886 (statement of Sen. Borah); a at 1912-13 (statement of Sen. Reed).
243. See id. at 2406 (statement of Rep. Sherley).
244. Id. at 2415 (statement of Rep. Witherspoon).
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appointment of Senators. 24 Once the power to elect was taken from
state legislatures, however, "the power of the Government to invade
the ballot box of the citizen and to interfere with the vote of the citizen
becomes absolute and complete."24'
In effect, then, the Democrats offered two arguments against the
Bristow Amendment. First, the Amendment enlarged federal power.
Second, and more importantly, any such enlargement of federal power
would be contradictory to the Senate's role as guardian of states' rights.
Neither argument, however, proved sufficient to carry the debate. As
to the first objection, the Democrats never put forth a concrete expla-
nation of how the failure to amend the Elections Clause would enlarge
federal power. The underlying assumption that the federal govern-
ment could not interfere in state legislative elections, and therefore
could not determine the electors for the Senate, was irrelevant to the
Elections Clause. By its express terms, Article I made the qualifica-
tions for voting in federal legislative elections the same as those for
voting in state elections, which qualifications the state itself deter-
mined.247 House Joint Resolution 39 continued this practice with
respect to Senate elections.248 True, the federal government could in-
tervene in Senate elections to prevent illegal discrimination, but (save
for the implied repeal that the Republicans suspected 49) an amend-
ment to the Elections Clause would not nullify the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. It is no wonder, then, that the Republicans
answered the argument about an enlargement of federal power by in-
viting the Democrats to prove their assertions.
The Democrats' core argument-that the election of a body de-
voted to the protection of state sovereignty should be controlled by the
states--could not be as easily dismissed. It forced an answer to the
paramount question that the Federalists had caused to linger: Did the
Senate represent the states as such, or the people? Moreover, because
the Democrats equated state sovereignty with the sovereignty of the
people of the several states, yet another question begged: If the Senate
represented the people, which people did it represent? The people of
the United States or the people of the several states?
The Republicans' rejoinder to the Democrats was unequivocal.
245. See id. at 1912 (statement of Sen. Reed).
246. Id. (statement of Sen. Reed).
247. See U.S. CONSr. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1.
248. See 47 CONG. REC. 203 (reading of House Joint Resolution 39 by the clerk)
("The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most
numerous branch of the State legislatures.").
249. See supra note 233.
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They repeatedly emphasized that amending the Elections Clause to
exclude federal supervision of Senate elections would create an incon-
gruity; elections for the House would be subject to federal supervision,
but not elections for the Senate. 0 The Republicans noted that this
lack of uniformity was particularly absurd in light of direct elections,
for "[t]he fact that Senators are now to be elected in the same manner
as Representatives affords all the more reason why the same power
should continue to exist in Congress in the one case as in the other."25'
The Democrats' contention that the incongruity was justifiable be-
cause the Senate represented states' sovereign interests held little sway.
Some Republicans believed that there had never been a difference be-
tween the representative capacities of the Senate and House,252 but to
the extent that there had been, "the only purpose of the amendment as
to the [direct] election of Senators is to do away with what little differ-
ence exists in this respect and make the Senators more directly
representative of the people."25' 3
The Republicans clearly intended that the Seventeenth Amend-
ment eliminate distinctions-real or fictional-in the representative
capacities of the Senate and the House. No difference in the federal
government's oversight powers could be justified because
[t]hese two bodies are coordinate bodies; they have the
same powers; they exercise the same authority. The Mem-
bers are all Members of the Congress; they are all Federal
officers; why should not the Federal Government have
power to regulate, when it may be necessary to regulate, the
election of its own officers?
Recognizing the Republicans' intent, the Democrats sought to il-
lustrate the implications of treating the Senate and House alike. This is
250. See 47 CoNG. REC. 2406 (statement of Rep. Hardy); id. at 2407 (statement of
Rep. Olmsted); id. at 2421 (statement of Rep. Cannon).
251. Id. at 2406 (statement of Rep. Olmsted).
252. See id. at 1486 (statement of Sen. Sutherland) ("A United States Senator is a
representative officer precisely the same as a Member of the House of Representatives
.... "); id. at 2417 (statement of Rep. Moon) (noting that House members have not his-
torically perceived themselves differently from Senators).
253. Id. at 2409 (statement of Rep. Young).
254. Id. at 2407 (statement of Rep. Olmsted); see also id. at 2,417 (statement of Rep.
Moon). Representative Moon stated:
Bear in mind ... that the two branches of the legislative department, the House
and the Senate, are one. They are not two coordinate powers, they are two parts
of one coordinate power, differing somewhat in their minor functions, but in all
constitutional powers, in all constitutional matters, one before the law of the
land.
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the only point of debate at which sustained attention was devoted to
Senate districts:
Mr. HARDY. Mr. Speaker, in my interruption of the gen-
tleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. OLMSTED] I asked him
but one question, and that was in what way Federal author-
ity over the election of Members of Congress had been
exercised, and his answer was to require that election to be
by districts. I want to say that that very answer discloses
one essential objection that we have to Federal authority
controlling the manner and time of election of Senators. To
say that Senators should be elected from the east and west
half of a State, or from this or that district of a State, might
be the action taken by the Federal Government under the
Bristow amendment, and that would be to destroy the very
purpose of the organization of the Senate of the United
States, which purpose was to have a body composed of rep-
resentatives of the States to sit as ambassadors of whole and
undivided States. 5
If the Bristow Amendment gave the federal government authority
to create Senate districts, it necessarily gave states this same power,
since the Amendment delegated regulatory power to the states in the
first instance!o This was the response of the Republicans by former
House Speaker Cannon, who believed that without the Bristow
Amendment states would be free to create such districts and the fed-
eral government would be powerless to either forbid or regulate them:
The gentleman from Pennsylvania [MR. OLMSTEAD] asked
a question as to whether it would be in the power of a
State-in effect, by throwing the State into districts-to elect
Senators by a minority vote in the event the House joint
resolution was enacted into law without the Senate amend-
ment. Undoubtedly that might be done. Undoubtedly the
respective State legislatures would have this power. And
yet gentlemen on that side-Democrats, glorying in "the
rule of the people"-propose to place it in the power of a
255. Id. at 2410 (statement of Rep. Hardy). Significantly, Representative Hardy ap.
peared to speak in blissful ignorance of the fact that states had previously elected
Senators by district. See ELECION OF SENATORS, supra note 106, at 31. In any event,
there is simply nothing inconsistent between Senators being elected from districts and
simultaneously representing entire states. See supra note 198. If a Senator from Ohio is a
representative of the whole nation, then a Senator from the northern district of Ohio is
also the representative of his entire state. See supra note 216.
256. See 47 CONG. REc. 1484 (1911) ("The times, places, and manner of holding elec.
tions for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature
thereof, but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except
as to the places of [choosing] Senators.").
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State legislature, by this joint resolution, to enact laws under
which practically a minority can choose Senators; and the
Congress of the United, States would be powerless in the
premises .... 27
Responding to Representative Cannon's equating of districts with
plurality votes, the Democratic floor manager of House Joint Resolu-
tion 39, Representative Rucker of Missouri, stated, "I confess I would
prefer to have a Senator elected by even a minority of honest, loyal
voters rather than to have that high office bought in and controlled by
special interests."2'58 Others were similarly expectant of (or resigned to)
the prospect of plurality votes, if not Senate districts themselves. 2 9
Thus, the Sixty-second Congress did not decide the constitutional-
ity of Senate districts; it neither rejected nor accepted them.2 60 Instead,
as former Speaker Cannon's remarks reveal, supporters of the Bristow
Amendment sought to preserve the authority Congress had been
granted by the original Constitution to mandate or forbid election
practices of whatever form, including Senate districts.
261
257. Id. at 2420 (statement of Rep. Cannon) (emphasis added). Although Representa-
tive Cannon's statement makes reference to a question posed by Representative Olmsted,
it is unclear what the exact question was. Shortly before Cannon's remarks, Olmsted
cited an 1842 act in which Congress required states to draw districts for House races as an
example of Congress's authority under the Elections Clause. The statement was made in
response to insinuations by the Democrats that the Elections Clause be repealed as to
both the House and the Senate because it had been so little used. See id. Representative
Bartlett, a Georgia Democrat, shortly thereafter asked, "Does the gentleman think the
power exists in the Congress now with reference to the election of Senators to prescribe
any regulations for electing Senators?" Id. (statement of Rep. Bartlett). Olmsted re-
sponded, "It has whatever power the Constitution now gives to Congress." Id. (statement
of Rep. Olmsted).
258. Id. at 2430 (statement of Rep. Rucker); see id. at 1485 (statement of Sen. Root).
259. See id. at 1485 (statement of Sen. Root) (noting that the election of Senators by a
plurality would be an inevitable consequence of direct elections); id. at 1741 (statement of
Sen. Borah) (suggesting that Senators elected from districts would nevertheless be repre-
sentative of the entire state). As is evident from former Speaker Cannon's statements,
"plurality" was at times used interchangeably with "districts" during the floor debates,
though some members may have used the former without intending to connote the latter.
See id. at 1881 (statement of Sen. McCumber) (assuming that direct elections would mean
statewide elections, but also noting that such elections would substitute plurality coali-
tions for majorities).
260. If Representative Hardy's parade of horribles highlighting Senate districts had
any effect on the Republicans, it was to solidify their resolve that the House and the Sen-
ate should be treated the same with respect to federal supervision of elections. As former
Speaker Cannon stated shortly after Hardy's statement, "I would not, to secure this joint
resolution, make legislation that would apply to this body in the election of its Members
and would not apply to the Senate in the election of its Members." Id. at 2421 (statement
of Rep. Cannon).
261. Like the 62nd Congress, previous Congresses had been aware that a shift to popular
elections might invite Senate districts. In 1899, during the 55th Congress, Senate Resolution
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Placed in the broader context of the debate over the representa-
tional capacity of the Senate, the Republicans' rejoinder on districts
was consistent with their overall theme of uniformity in the treatment
of the House and the Senate. To the question "whom does the Senate
represent, states or the people?" Republicans answered that the Sen-
ate's representative capacity was the same as the House's-both bodies
represented the people. As such, federal supervision over both bodies
was appropriate. A parallel in constituencies, however, was insufficient
to overcome the Democrats' sovereignty arguments, for the Democrats
had placed sovereignty in the people of the several states rather than
the people of the United States. Given this premise, to say that the
Senate represented the people begged the question, "which people?"
This dilemma was as old as the Republic itsef. 62
In tones evocative of the nationalizing experience of Reconstruc-
tion,263 the Republicans responded that sovereignty belonged not to the
people of a particular state but to the citizens of the United States. A
Senator, the Republicans repeated often, is not merely a representative
of his state but also a representative of the United States.? 6 Indeed, a
243 expressly provided that Senators be elected "at large by a direct vote of the people." 32
CONG. REC. 1678 (1899) (reading of resolution by Sen. Allen). This limitation is not mere
surplusage, for the popular movement for direct elections had produced proposals which
varied significantly in their specifics. Consider, for example, the Farmers' Alliance Party
Platform of 1900. In contrast to Senate Resolution 243, it specifically called for the division
of each state into two districts with one Senator to be elected from each district. Wallace
Worthy Hall, The History and Effect of the Seventeenth Amendment 496, App. D (1936)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California) (on file with author).
The 62nd Congress's exchange regarding Senate districts must be understood against
this backdrop of competing conceptions of direct elections. Had the 62nd Congress
wanted to mandate statewide elections, prior congressional resolutions provided prece-
dent for doing so. At the same time, had it wanted to expressly provide for Senate
districts, it had ample points of reference from both the public debate regarding direct
elections and from the practices of some states prior to the adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment. The 62nd Congress, however, chose neither option. In so doing, it abdi-
cated the question of Senate districts to the broad authority of the states and Congress
under the Elections Clause of the Constitution.
262. See MORGAN, supra note 110, at 262. Morgan writes:
Although independence had determined that Americans were not part of the
people of Great Britain, it had not determined whether they were one people or
many, or whether the sovereignty of the people, say, of Virginia was exhausted
in the creation of an independent government for Virginia. If Americans were
in any sense one people, did that people enjoy a sovereignty too? And if so, who
were their representatives?
Id.
263. See generally Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era
of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 884-99, 910-17 (1986)
(discussing Northern Republicans' successful efforts to impose upon the nation their view
of national supremacy).
264. See 47 CONG. REC. 1487-88 (statement of Sen. Sutherland); id. at 230 (statement
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Senator was more a national representative than a House member:
[A] Senator of the United States, while he may be ... a rep-
resentative of the State, is more a representative of the
United States than is a Member of the House. The Repre-
sentative, the Member of the House of Representatives, has
nothing to do with the question of treaties. He has nothing
to do with the confirmation of appointees to Federal posi-
tions and ambassadors to foreign governments. The
Senator of the United States passes upon treaties with for-
eign governments. A Senator of the United States advises
and consents to the appointment of the judges, ambassa-
dors, and all the other officers of the United States. In that
condition, can it be said that the Government of the United
States should absolutely yield to the States its control over the
election of such an officer, who discharges these important
functions of the National Government?2
The proponents of the proposed amendment to the Elections
Clause could not dispute the validity of these arguments. They were
forced to acknowledge that a Senator represents the people of the na-
tion as well as his state.266 Thus conceded, it was difficult, if not
impossible, to maintain that the federal government had no interest in
controlling the manner of electing Senators. The Democrats were re-
duced to sophistry. "I do not regard the election of a United States
Senator as a local affair," confessed Senator Borah of Idaho, "but I re-
gard the manner of holding the election where he is elected as purely a
local affair. I contend that there can be no such thing as a national in-
terest in the manner of holding a popular election in a State."267
The placement of sovereignty with the people of the United States
removed state sovereignty as a potential barrier to Senate districts.
The Democrats' concession that Senators were national representa-
tives to the same extent as House members meant that there was no
distinction between the representative capacities of the two-both rep-
resented the people of the nation.m To the extent the debates
of Rep. Dyer); see id. at 1542 (statement of Sen. Heyburn). Heyburn did not support the
direct election of Senators but did oppose modifying the Elections Clause. See id. at 1543.
265. See id. at 1488 (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
266. See, e.g., id. at 1910 (statement of Sen. Bacon).
267. Id. at 1889 (statement of Sen. Borah).
268. One might observe that acceptance of the Republicans' view of the Senator as the
more national representative between Senators and House members cuts against districts.
If Senators are to have a broader perspective than House members, should they not be
elected by a broader constituency? They should, and, in most instances, Senate districts
would encompass a vastly broader constituency than House districts. In the nation-sized
state of California, for example, each Senator would be elected in districts of approxi-
mately 15 million persons. In smaller states, where drawing districts would leave a state's
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recognized a residual state sovereignty function in a Senator's repre-
sentation, they also established that such a function would not be
inconsistent with districts. A Senator's dual function as a representa-
tive of both her state and nation only confirms that it is possible for a
Senator to serve a broader constituency than the one which elects her.
If a Senator elected from New York represents the nation and her
state, then a Senator elected from the "city" district of New York
would represent the whole state as well as her district.
Significantly, although the Republicans correctly located sover-
eignty in the people of the United States, an opposite view would not
have meant that Senate districts were unconstitutional. If, as the
Democrats maintained, the people of a given state possessed sover-
eignty, then that state's citizens possessed the power to divide
sovereignty as they saw fit, allocating some representational power to
one Senator and the remainder to the other. Senate districts are per-
missible because sovereignty is divisible. Its divisible nature does not
depend on which people possess it.
The Bristow Amendment cleared the Senate on a dramatic tie-
breaking vote by the Vice President James S. Sherman.2 9 House Joint
Resolution 39 was then remanded to the House for its concurrence, but
the House declined to adopt the Bristow Amendment.270 The stale-
mate was broken when, in the face of an immovable Senate, the House
adopted the resolution as modified by the Bristow Amendment.2  The
Seventeenth Amendment was ratified by the states within a year's
time.272
Senators representing the same number or fewer constituents than House members, Sen-
ate districting might be inappropriate.
269. See 47 CONG. REC. 1923.
270. See id. at 2548,4905.
271. See id. at 5172,6367.
272. See I BYRD, supra note 218, at 403. The available state ratification records shed
almost no light on the question of Senate districts. State libraries, archives and legisla-
tures were contacted to determine whether individual states kept legislative histories or
debates regarding the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment. The overwhelming ma-
jority of states kept no transcribed records of legislative debates, but only roll call votes
and procedural histories. In addition to reviewing available journal records, the author
sought, and in most instances obtained, confirmation from the states that no transcribed
records of ratification debates exist. The following is an accounting of the responses re-
ceived, including letters indicating that verbatim debates were not maintained:
ARIZONA-Senate journals do not reflect the substance of the debates on the Seven-
teenth Amendment, but no confirmation letter regarding debates obtained.
ARKANSAS-Letter from John L. Ferguson, State Historian, Arkansas History Commis-
sion, to Terry Smith, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law
(July 31, 1995) (on file with author).
CALnORNIA-Letter from John F. Bums, Director, and Sydney Bailey, Archives Assis-
tant, California State Archives, to Terry Smith, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham
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University School of Law (July 7,1995) (on file with author).
COLORADo-Letter from Terry Ketelsen, State Archivist, State of Colorado Division of
Archives and Public Records, to Terry Smith, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Uni-
versity School of Law (June 20, 1995) (on file with author).
CONNECriCUT-LAWRENCE G. CHEESEMAN & ARLENE C. BiELEFIELD, THE
CONNEcTIcuT LEGAL RESEARCH HANDBOOK 40 (1992) (indicating that transcribed
proceedings of house and senate floor debates are partially available only from 1945 to
1953 and are complete beginning in 1953).
DELAVARE-Letter from Randy L. Goss, Archivist Supervisor, Delaware State Ar-
chives, to Terry Smith, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law
(June 19, 1995) (on file with author).
FLORIDA-Letter from David J. Coles, Florida State Archives, to Terry Smith, Associate
Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law (Aug. 23, 1995) (on file with
author).
IDAHO-Letter from Steve Averett, Idaho State Law Library, to Terry Smith, Associate
Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law (Aug. 23, 1995) (on file with
author).
ILLINOIS-Legislative History-a guide to compiling a legislative history (on file with
author).
INDIANA-Letter from Martha E. Wright, Reference Librarian, Indiana Division, Indi-
ana State Library, to Terry Smith, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University
School of Law (June 14,1995) (on file with author).
IOWA-Letter from Linda Robertson, Law Librarian, Iowa State Law Library, to Terry
Smith, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law (Aug. 24, 1995)
(on file with author).
KANSAS-Senate journals do not reflect the substance of the debates on the Seventeenth
Amendment, but no confirmation regarding debates obtained.
LOUISIANA-Letter from Virginia R. Smith, Head, Louisiana Section, State Library of
Louisiana, to Terry Smith, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of
Law (Aug. 25,1995) (on file with author).
MAINE-Letter from Lynn E. Randall, State Law Librarian, State of Maine Law and
Legislative Reference Library, to Terry Smith, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham
University School of Law (Aug. 7,1995) (on file with author).
MICMGAN-Letter from Nancy B. Whitmer, Reference Librarian, Library of Michigan
State Law Library, to Terry Smith, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University
School of Law (Sept. 5,1995) (on file with author).
MINNESOTA-Letter from Brigid Shields, Reference Librarian, Minnesota Historical
Society, to Terry Smith, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law
(Aug. 23,1995) (on file with author).
MISSOURI-Letter from Christyn Elley, Missouri State Archives, Office of the Secretary
of State, State of Missouri, to Terry Smith, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Univer-
sity School of Law (June 29,1995) (on file with author).
MONTANA-Letter from the State of Montana State Law Library, to Terry Smith, Asso-
ciate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law (June 1995) (on file with
author).
NEBRASKA-Journal records obtained from state do not reflect the substance of the de-
bates on the Seventeenth Amendment, but no confirmation regarding debates obtained.
NEVADA-Letter from Patricia Deadder, Reference Department, Nevada State Library
and Archives, to Terry Smith, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of
Law (Aug. 28,1995) (on file with author).
NEW HAMPSHRE-Letter from Frank Mevers, Director and State Archivist, New Hamp-
shire State Archives, to Terry Smith, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University
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School of Law (Aug. 29, 1995) (on file with author).
NEW JERSEY-Letter from Robert E. Lupp, Supervising Librarian, New Jersey Publica-
tions, State of New Jersey Department of Education, to Terry Smith, Associate Professor
of Law, Fordham University School of Law (July 26,1995) (on file with author).
NEW MEXiCO-Letter from Kevin M. Lancaster, Associate Librarian, New Mexico Su-
preme Court Law Library, to Terry Smith, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham
University School of Law (June 14, 1995) (on file with author); Letter from Al Regens-
berg, Senior Archivist, New Mexico Commission of Public Records, State Records Center
and Archives, to Terry Smith, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of
Law (June 14,1995) (on file with author).
NEW YORK-Transcripts of debates do not exist before 1960 in the senate and 1973 in the
house. See ROBERT ALLAN CARTER, LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN NEW YORK STATE 20
(1981) (on file with author).
NORTH CAROLINA-Louise Stafford, North Carolina Legislative History, N.C. ST. B.Q.,
Winter 1991, at 23-24; Latter from Janet Justis, Government Documents Specialist, North
Carolina Department of Cultural Resources Division of State Library, to Terry Smith,
Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law (June 16, 1995) (on file
with author).
NORTH DAKOTA-Letter from Marcella Kramer, Assistant Law Librarian, State of
North Dakota, Supreme Court Law Library, to Terry Smith, Associate Professor of Law,
Fordham University School of Law (Aug. 23, 1995) (on file with author).
OHIO-Letter from Clyde Hordusky, Head, Research Services, The State Library of
Ohio, to Terry Smith, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law
(June 27,1995) (on file with author).
OKLAHOMA-See OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF LIBRARIES, SOURCES OF INFOR-
MATION ON OKLAHOMA BILLS (on file with author).
OREGON-Letter from Julie Ann Bouch6, Library Assistant, Oregon Supreme Court
Law Library, to Terry Smith, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of
Law (June 12, 1995) (on file with author).
RHODE ISLAND-Letter from Thomas R. Evans, State Librarian, State of Rhode Island
and Providence Plantations, to Terry Smith, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Uni-
versity School of Law (July 24, 1995) (on file with. author).
SOuTH DAKOTA-Letter from Clare Cholik, Legislative Librarian, South Dakota Legis-
lative Research Council, to Terry Smith, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University
School of Law (June 12, 1995) (on file with author).
TENNESSEE-Letter from Kassie Hassler, Librarian, Tennessee State Library & Ar-
chives, to Terry Smith, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law
(Aug. 28,1995) (on file with author).
TEXAS-See TEXAS STATE ARCHIVES, RESOURCES FOR LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH (on
file with author).
UTAH-Letter from State of Utah Law Library, to Terry Smith, Associate Professor of
Law, Fordham University School of Law (June 13, 1995) (on file with author).
VERMONT-Letter from Paul Donovan, Senior Reference Librarian, State of Vermont
Department of Libraries, to Terry Smith, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Univer-
sity School of Law (Aug. 23, 1995) (on file with author).
VIRGINIA-Letter from Sarah Huggins, Reference Librarian, The Library of Virginia, to
Terry Smith, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law (Sept. 15,
1995) (on file with author).
WASHINGTON-Letter from David W. Hastings, Chief of Archives, Washington State
Archives Service, to Terry Smith, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University
School of Law (June 13, 1995) (on file with author).
WEST VIRGINIA-Letter from Debra Basham, Archivist, West Virginia Division of Cul-
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B. The Implications of the Ratification of the Seventeenth
Amendment for Senate Districts
The ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment raises an inter-
pretive ambiguity regarding the question of Senate districts. The
language of the Amendment itself is silent. The congressional debates
suggest that this silence should be interpreted to mean that the issue
was left unresolved. The available state ratification records provide
little assistance.273
The traditional originalist, one who limits her inquiry to what the
drafters of a text intended at the time of enactment, 2-4 will likely have
one of two reactions. The first and more formalistic is that since the
historical evidence is inconclusive, districts are impermissible.2 s The
second, and arguably more intuitive reaction, is that in the absence of
conclusive evidence prohibiting the practice, the broad language of the
Elections Clause of Article I should be applied to the Seventeenth
Amendment as it is applied to its similarly-worded analogue, Section 2
of Article I, under which House districts are permitted.2Y6
ture and History, to Terry Smith, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School
of Law (June 30, 1995) (on file with author).
WISCONSIN-A. PETER CANNON, LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY RESEARCH IN WISCONSIN 5 (1990) (on file with
author).
WYOMING-Letter from Kathy Carlson, Wyoming State Law Librarian, Wyoming State
Law Library, to Terry Smith, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of
Law (June 16,1995) (on file with author).
Of the records the author was able to obtain, only Pennsylvania kept records of leg-
islative debates regarding the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment which implied
an understanding of the Amendment to include state at-large elections. See Pennsylvania
State House of Representatives Legislative Journal (daily ed. Feb. 3,1913).
The author was unable to obtain information from Kentucky and Massachusetts.
273. See supra note 272.'
274. See Lessig, supra note 26, at 1182-83 ("Fidelity, [the traditional originalist le-
lieves], means applying the original text now the same as it would have been applied
then.").
275. See id.
276. The originalist on either side of this question may observe that this Article has not
discussed the post-enactment history of the Seventeenth Amendment. This omission is in-
tentional. First, questions of post-enactment practice are sufficiently complex to warrant
separate extended treatment elsewhere. For originalists, moreover, post-ratification history
is "the least reliable source for recovering the original meaning of the law ... ." Calabresi &
Prakash, supra note 195, at 553. As Jack Rakove explains:
The Constitution derives its supremacy.., from a direct expression of popular
sovereignty, superior in authority to all subsequent legal acts resting only on the
weaker foundations of representation. If this becomes the premise of interpreta-
tion, it follows that the understanding of the ratifiers is the preeminent and
arguably sole source for reconstructing original meaning.
JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 9 (1996).
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Whatever the interpretive ambiguity created by application of tra-
ditional originalism, however, the permissibility of Senate districts is
clear when translation originalism is applied. Like traditional original-
ism, translation originalism seeks to comprehend the meaning of a text
as that text was understood by its enactors.2n Translation originalism,
however, departs from the traditional school by seeking to preserve
original meaning across different factual contexts, locating in each new
context the analogue of the original intent of the drafters.278 The dif-
ference in approach can fairly be described as a difference in the level
of generality at which one construes original intent.2 9 Thus, under
translation originalism, the fact that Senate districts are not mentioned
in the text of the Seventeenth Amendment, and were not conclusively
debated during the Sixty-second Congress or by the states, does not
resolve the question of their permissibility. Rather than a static inter-
pretation of text based upon its original understanding, the translator
looks to the underlying values that the drafters embraced and the ends
that they sought to achieve. She then interprets a constitutional provi-
sion in a manner that best advances those values in a modem setting.
211
1. Translating Intent: The Political Participation of Racial
Minorities
Some of the values the Seventeenth Amendment sought to ad-
vance can be gleaned by looking beyond the debates of the Sixty-
second Congress to the broader movement for the direct election of
Senators. Advocates of direct elections, for instance, sought to make
the Senate more "responsive" to the popular will.M  A modem transla-
tion of Progressives' concern with responsiveness requires recognition
that today's electorate is far more heterogeneous than in 1913, when
racial minorities were substantially precluded from participating in the
277. See Lessig, supra note 26, at 1183.
278. See id. at 1184, 1211-13.
279. See Treanor, supra note 26, at 859 (arguing that in order to understand the proper
modem scope of the Takings Clause one must look beyond concrete formulations and
more broadly to the Framers' motivations). The merit of such an approach is that it rec-
ognizes that neither the original Framers nor the drafters of the Seventeenth Amendment
could have anticipated the myriad circumstances in which the relevant text would be ap-
plied. According to Professor Treanor, the approach is also faithful to a mode of
constitutional interpretation that the Framers themselves apparently intended to be used,
one of interpretive flexibility. See id. at 858.
280. See id. at 857.
281. See HOEBEKE, supra note 9, at 83, 128-29, 131, 193. As Hoebeke notes, there is
considerable question whether the Senate was in fact as unresponsive as the Progressives
portrayed, and, in any event, the popular will was not so easily ascertained. See id. at 83,
128-29, 131.
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political process.2 Senate districts would ensure greater responsive-
ness to groups whose interests were not considered at the time of the
Amendment's passage.2
The creation of districts to enhance the protection of racial mi-
norities' interests is especially appropriate in the case of the United
States Senate because the Senate is an inherently anti-majoritarian in-
stitution. Article V's guarantee of equal representation in the Senate
already affords special protection to geographic minorities; M a minor-
ity of the population may block legislation supported by a majority.
Senate districts would simply update the anti-majoritarian premise of
the Senate by recognizing that statehood may now be less meaningful
than other forms of political identity, such as race.m
282. Although the Civil War amendments conferred upon former slaves the constitu-
tional right to vote, in many parts of the country, particularly the South, those
amendments were not honored until the second half of the twentieth century. See gener-
ally Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the
Progressive Era, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 835 (1982) (analyzing the Supreme Court's handling
of black disenfranchisement during the Progressive Era). Indeed, the racialized tone of
the debates on the Seventeenth Amendment attest to the then extant disenfranchisement
of Black Southerners. See supra note 233.
283. As Hoebeke notes: "Direct democracy simply multiplied the voices which called
upon government for aid and protection, so that none but the largest or loudest interests
could be heard." HOEBEKE, supra note 9, at 128. For an extensive discussion of racial
minorities' continued marginalization in the American political process, see generally
LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994).
284. See U.S. CONST. art. V (providing for equal representation of a state in the Senate
regardless of its population).
285. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The One Senator, One Vote Clause, 12 CONST.
COMMENTARY 159, 159-60 (1995). Professor Eskridge provides the following examples of
this anomaly:
[I]f Senate votes were weighted according to the states' representation in the
House (each Senator receiving half of the state's House allotment), the Senate
would have voted 295-140 to override President Bush's veto of the 1990 civil
rights bill, would have rejected the nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas for
the Supreme Court in 1991 (albeit in a close vote, 224-211), and would have
overwhelmingly (238-165) voted to remove the ban on entry into the United
States of people who are infected with the HIV virus (a move that was defeated
by 52-46 when proposed in 1993).
Id. at 160.
286. See Eli Zaretsky, Identity Theory, Identity Politics: Psychoanalysis, Marxism, Post-
Structuralism, in SOCIAL THEORY AND THE POLrICS OF IDENTITY 198 passim (Craig Cal-
houn ed., 1994). Zaretsky writes:
Beginning in the late 1960s a new form of political life emerged, especially in the
US, which more recently has been termed "identity politics." It had two main
characteristics: first, an emphasis on difference rather than commonality; sec-
ond, the local or particular community of identity-such as lesbianism or the
African-American community-was intended as the central point of identifica-
tion for the self.
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Moreover, apart from notions of political identity, the reality is
that state lines are far less relevant to the modem Senate and thus
cannot justify the status quo of at-large elections. A number of factors
explain this transformation. American society has become more na-
tionalized through transportation and telecommunications advances,
and there is an increased "standard of living and level of education, and
a more urban and mobile populace."m These changes, aided by the
growth in the national government, the corresponding growth in the
work of the Senate, and the burgeoning of national advocacy groups
and issues, have in turn nationalized the Senate.29 Characteristic of
this change is the conduct of Senate elections. Most money raised in
Senate races comes from outside the states in which the candidates
run.
21 Moreover, Senators now identify themselves with particular na-
tional issues and constituencies to the point where, in the words of
political scientist Nelson Polsby, "[t]he more common pattern today is
for senators to seek to become national politicians, something the mass
media have made increasingly possible."2
91
The prospect of Senate districts must be evaluated in light of mod-
Id at 198; see also Alexandra Natapoff, Madisonian Mutliculturalism, 45 AM. U. L. REV.
751, 752 (1996) ("[R]ace today is an important political determinant that inspires significant
factional interest-group jockeying, not only between whites and minorities, but between
different groups of color."); Mark S. Nagel, Note, Constitutional Limits on Racial Redistrict-
ing: Miller v. Johnson, HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 188, 198 (1995) ("[Race remains one of
the most important factors in American politics."); Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Transcript,
Panel Presentation on Cultural Battery, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 891, 891 (1995) (discussing the
domestic violence movement as a successful example of women's identity politics and defin-
ing the term to mean "resistance politics, organized and mobilized around the concept of
identity as a woman").
In her dissent in Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995), Justice Ginsburg recog-
nized the potential for race and ethnicity to be overriding determinants of political
identity:
[E]thnicity itself can tie people together, as volumes of social science literature
have documented-even people with divergent economic interests. For this rea-
son, ethnicity is a significant force in political life.... To accommodate the
reality of ethnic bonds, legislatures have long drawn voting districts along ethnic
lines. Our Nation's cities are full of districts identified by their ethnic charac-
ter-Chinese, Irish, Italian, Jewish, Polish, Russian, for example.
Id. at 2504-05 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
287. See generally FRED R. HARRIS, DEADLOCK OR DECISION: THE U.S. SENATE AND
THE RISE OF NATIONAL POLITICs 91-158 (1993) (discussing how the nationalization of
American society and the advocacy explosion of the 1950's produced a national and indi-
vidualistic Senate).
288. Id. at 94.
289. See id. at 94-95.
290. See id. at 72.
291. Id. at 95 (internal quotations omitted); see also id. at 69-70 (maintaining that na-
tional issues and interest groups provide Senators with greater opportunities to gain political
power and national prominence).
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em notions of political identity and an increasingly nationalized society
and Senate. Statewide Senate elections elevate geographic lines above
more substantive political divisions such as race and gender. They ig-
nore the effect of technology and transportation on. the notions of
statehood, particularly as that construct relates to the Senate and its
elections. As a consequence of adhering to statewide elections merely
for their own sake, the goal of a more responsive Senate is thwarted
and the voices of racial minorities are submerged in a fashion that is
typical of such at-large arrangements.
One might observe, however, that defining responsiveness in ra-
cial terms may run counter to current notions of equal protection.
Thus, the argument goes, race-motivated districting is not a permissible
means of making the Senate more responsive to minority concerns.2"
An examination of the Supreme Court's recent redistricting decisions
belies this argument, however. In Shaw v. Reno,2 white voters chal-
lenged two congressional districts in which Blacks constituted a
majority of the population. By several accounts, both districts were
oddly shaped.29 Moreover, there was evidence that the districts'
shapes were the result of unconventional districting practices, such as
dividing counties and towns and allocating them among multiple dis-
tricts.29 The plaintiffs charged that the districts' distorted contours
were the result of the North Carolina legislature's efforts to create the
two majority-Black districts at issue.296 Reversing a lower court's dis-
missal for failure to state a claim, the Supreme Court announced that it
would strictly scrutinize majority-minority congressional districts
which, due to their disregard of traditional districting criteria, "can be
understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting
districts because of their race .... , Finding that plaintiffs need not
suffer a dilution of their proportionate voting strength in order to state
an equal protection violation,29 the Shaw Court announced an
292. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2598 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(describing the creation of majority-minority districts as "an enterprise of segregating the
races into political homelands that amounts... to nothing short of a system of 'political
apartheid' ") (citations omitted).
293. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
294. See id. at 635-36.
295. See id. at 636-37.
296. See id. at 637.
297. Id. at 657-58.
298. Whites in the two majority-Black districts in Shaw did not suffer a dilution of their
proportional voting strength because whites still occupied 10 of the 12 North Carolina con-
gressional seats, even after the creation of the Black districts. See id at 634. Whites
constituted 78% of North Carolina's voting age population. See id
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"analytically distinct" claim that required no tangible injury. 9
Whether or not White voters were underrepresented by a districting
plan, they were harmed if the plan relied on racial stereotyping that
suggested "members of the same racial group-regardless of their age,
education, economic status, or the community in which they live-
think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same
candidates at the polls."
300
In Miller v. Johnson,301 the Court attempted to clarify and expand
upon the reasoning in Shaw. As in Shaw, Miller involved an equal pro-
tection challenge to two new majority-minority congressional districts.
And, like Shaw, there was evidence that the new majority-Black dis-
tricts had been achieved by disregarding traditional districting
practicesY°2 Writing for a five-Justice majority, Justice Kennedy de-
scribed the evidentiary burden that plaintiffs must meet in order to
trigger strict scrutiny of a redistricting plan:
The plaintiff's burden is to show, either through circumstan-
tial evidence of a district's shape and demographics or more
direct evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was
the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision
to place a significant number of voters within or without a
particular district. To make this showing, a plaintiff must
prove that the legislature subordinated traditional race-
neutral districting principles, including but not limited to
compactness, contiguity, respect for political subdivisions or
communities defined by actual shared interests, to racial
considerations. Where these or other race-neutral consid-
erations are the basis for redistricting legislation, and are
not subordinated to race, a state can "defeat a claim that a
district has been gerrymandered on racial lines."' '
Whatever may be the effects of Shaw and its progeny on majority-
299. Id. at 652.
300. Id. at 647.
301. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
302. See id. at 2483-84.
303. Id at 2488 (citations omitted). The Court found that plaintiffs had satisfied their
burden and applied strict scrutiny to Georgia's districting plan. See id. at 2489-90. Georgia
offered as a compelling state interest its need to comply with Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965. While acknowledging that compliance with the Voting Rights Act might consti-
tute a compelling state interest, the Court held that the Justice Department's interpretation
of Section 5 incorrectly required the state of Georgia to maximize the number of Black con-
gressional districts to reflect as closely as possible the percentage of the state's Black
population. See id. at 2490-91. "[C]ompliance with federal antidiscrimination laws cannot
justify race-based districting where the challenged district was not reasonably necessary un-
der a constitutional reading and application of those laws." Id. at 2491 (citations omitted).
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minority House districts, these precedents do not preclude the creation
of majority-minority or minority-enhanced Senate districts, for such
districts can be drawn in accordance with traditional districting criteria.
Suppose, for example, that New York were divided into two districts
for purposes of electing its two federal Senators. The state might adopt
a districting system for a number of reasons, including its potential to
enhance the representation of minority interests. Nothing in Shaw or
Miller suggests that the adoption of such a system constitutes a suspect
classification merely because it is enacted with an intent to enhance the
representation of minority interests.' 4 Instead, under these precedents,
whether strict scrutiny is applied will turn on the manner in which the
districting is carried out.
Suppose further that in drawing its Senate districts, New York's
legislature included the whole of the City of New York in one district
and most of upstate New York in another. This is a realistic assump-
tion since the geopolitics of the state are basically two-dimensional-
New York City versus the rest of the state. s The result of such a dis-
tricting scheme is an outcome that comports with traditional districting
principles by maintaining political subdivisions and geographic com-
munities of interest and ensuring compactness and contiguity.
The result is also a district with substantially more minorities than
the statewide population? Racial minorities comprise approximately
304. Indeed, Shaw expressly declined to answer the question "whether 'the intentional
creation of majority-minority districts, without more', always gives rise to an equal protec-
tion claim." Shaw, 509 U.S. at 649 (quoting id at 668 (White, J., dissenting)). United Jewish
Organization of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, however, appears to answer this question in
the negative. There the Court upheld New York's creation of majority-minority districts
against equal protection objections, finding that the deliberate use of race in a redistricting
plan, without more, does not render it constitutionally infirm. See United Jewish Organiza-
tion, 430 U.S. at 165. The opinion nowhere purports to apply strict s.rutiny. Analogously,
New York's shift from at-large Senate elections to districts for purposes of enhancing minor-
ity representation should not by itself invoke heightened review.
305. See 20 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 228h (1989) ("New York City is often
pitted against the rest of the state."); Alan Finder, The Governor's Race: What's in It for
Us, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 6,1994, § 13, at 1 ("The regional distinctions that have defined New
York's statewide campaigns for decades have loomed large in this year's [1994] guberna-
torial race.").
306. The Supreme Court has not decided whether "influence" districts, those in which
minorities constitute a substantial number but not a majority, are cognizable as a remedy
in voting rights litigation. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 154 (1993). However,
the Court recentiy intimated its approval of such districts by vacating the judgment in
Rural W. Tenn. African-American Affairs Council Inc. v. McWherter, 836 F. Supp. 453
(W.D. Tenn. 1993), and remanding the case for reconsideration in light of Johnson v.
DeGrandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994). See Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at 2775. On remand, the
three-judge panel approved the creation of an influence district in lieu of maximizing the
number of majority-minority districts. See Rural W. Tenn. African-American Affairs
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30.7% of the State of New York's population.3° However, they consti-
tute 56.8% of New York City's population."' Because Senate districts
would likely be held to the population equality requirements of Rey-
nolds v. Sims,309 counties surrounding New York City would have to be
included in the "city" district to prevent malapportionment. By in-
cluding in the city Senate district all counties comprising the New York
Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area,"0 rough population equality is
achieved.3 '
Thus configured, racial minorities would constitute 43.5% of the
city Senate district, an increase of nearly 13% over their statewide pro-. 312
portion. If minorities in the city Senate district vote as a cohesive
group, the increase in their voting strength would substantially increase
the odds of electing a minority-preferred candidate.3 13 A similar result
may obtain in other states whose geopolitical and residential patterns
track New York's.
31 4
Council, Inc. v. McWherter, 877 F. Supp. 1096, 1098 (W.D. Tenn. 1995), affd sub nom.
Rural W. Tenn. African-American Affairs Council, Inc. v. Sundquist, 116 S. Ct. 42 (1995).
307. See THE NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INST. OF Gov'T, NEW YORK STATE STA-
TISTICAL YEARBOOK 9 (1994) [hereinafter STATISTICAL YEARBOOK].
308. See id.
309. 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964) ("[A] State [must] make an honest and good faith effort to
construct districts ... as nearly of equal population as is practicable.").
310. A "Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area" is defined as a large urbanized county or
a group of counties possessing strong economic and social ties. The urban center or group of
counties must also have close ties to portions of their surrounding areas. See STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK, supra note 307, at 7.
311. The New York Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area constitutes 47.5% of New
York State's total population. See id. at 12. This population deviation may be justified "on
the basis of some legitimate, consistently applied policy," such as preserving the voting
strength of minority groups. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 741 (1983); but see id at 741-
44 (rejecting the latter justification as unproven by the State of New Jersey).
312. See supra text accompanying note 307-08.
313. The author does not mean to suggest by using an influence district example that
influence districts are preferable to majority-minority districts. Instead, the above illus-
tration is used only as the most straight-forward instance in which Senate districts would
satisfy equal protection claims.
314. States with urban centers which might form the core of a majority-minority or mi-
nority-enhanced Senate district include: California (Los Angeles, 47.2% minority); Illinois
(Chicago, 54.6% minority); Michigan (Detroit, 78.4% minority); and Pennsylvania
(Philadelphia, 46.5% minority). See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COUNTY AND CITY DATA
BOOK 674,722,758,806 (1994).
States with dispersed minority populations-such as North Carolina in Shaw and
Georgia in Miller-do not necessarily make the creation of Senate districts to benefit
minorities more constitutionally risky. Any definition of compactness in the Senate dis-
trict context must take account of the fact that each Senate district will encompass half of
the state's population. Therefore, the norm for compactness--or for that matter, for any
other traditional districting criteria-will necessarily be different than for House districts.
See infra notes 324-26 and accompanying text.
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Even if strict scrutiny were applied to the New York districts, ei-
ther because they were adopted with the intent of aiding minorities or
because traditional districting principles were subordinated to race, the
districts may still survive if New York can show that it acted to remedy
the effects of past discrimination or to avoid liability for vote dilution
under the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Last term, in Bush v. Vera and
Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw I)1,316 the Supreme Court recognized both these
defenses as potentially compelling.P
The Court's discussion of vote dilution claims under the Voting
Rights Act in Vera and Shaw II is especially relevant to the possibility
of creating Senate districts in states whose minority populations are
dispersed. With respect to the states' interest in avoiding liability for
vote dilution under the Voting Rights Act, the Court has assumed that
such an interest would be compelling. 31 The Court's opinions in both
Vera and Shaw II set forth the requirements for a finding of vote dilu-
tion under Section 2 of the Act: (1) the minority group must be
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority
in a single-member district; (2) the minority must vote cohesively; (3)
the White majority must vote as a bloc so as to usually defeat the mi-
nority-preferred candidate. 31  Although the Court did not require a
preponderance of proof that a Section 2 violation existed, it held in
each case that the states had not narrowly tailored their redistricting to
avoid Section 2 liability because the minority populations encompassed
by the new districts lacked the requisite compactness. 320 According to
the Court, the contorted shapes of the districts and the evident disre-
gard of traditional districting criteria "defeat[ed] any claim that the
districts are narrowly tailored to serve the State's interest in avoiding
liability under § 2, because § 2 does not require a State to create, on
predominantly racial lines, a district that is not reasonably compact."
321
Finally, the possibilities for majority-minority and minority-enhanced districts are
augmented by the fact that by the middle of the twenty-first century, minorities will com-
prise nearly one-half of the nation. See William O'Hare, Diversity Trend: More
Minorities Looking Less Alike, POPULATION TObiAY, Apr. 1993, at 1.
315. 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
316. 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
317. See Vera, 116 S. Ct at 1960-63; Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1902-05.
318. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1960; Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1905.
319. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1961; Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1905.
320. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1960-61.
321. Id at 1961 (internal quotation omitted); see also Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1906 ("No
one looking at District 12 could reasonably suggest that the district contains a
'geographically compact' population of any race. Therefore where that district sits, 'there
neither has been a wrong nor can be a remedy.' ") (citations omitted). The Court's defini-
tion of geographic compactness in Vera and Shaw II is substantially more stringent than
1996]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The Court's geographic-compactness limitation on states' use of
the Voting Rights Act as a justification for creating majority-minority
districts would be inapplicable to Senate districts. To prove a violation
of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in statewide elections for United
States Senators, plaintiffs must show statewide vote dilution. In as-
sessing whether plaintiffs are sufficiently geographically compact in the
context of a challenge to this office, a court cannot logically apply the
same compactness requirements as it applies to an office with a smaller
constituency. 323 Because the Constitution would restrict the number of
Senate districts per state to two, into which equal populations must be
placed, the benchmark for compactness must be the geographic con-
tours, demographics and population dispersion of the entire state;
smaller electoral units are simply inapposite.
4
Thus, the Seventeenth Amendment's broad purpose of effectuat-
lower courts' application of this criterion. "[L]ower courts have, almost without exception,
interpreted [the compactness requirement] of the first prong to mean only contiguity. Thus,
the courts have tended not to separate the question of geographic compactness from the
question of whether the minority group is numerous enough to constitute a majority."
BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING
EQUALITY 64 (1992); see also BERNARD GROFMAN, Expert Witness Testimony and the
Evolution of Voting Rights Case Law, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 218-19 (Bernard Grofman et al. eds., 1992) (stating
that lower courts had generally interpreted the compactness requirement loosely to mean
only that the minority population must be "sufficiently geographically concentrated so that a
district could be created in which the minority is a majority").
322. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647,2662 (1994) (limiting a § 2 inquiry to the
area for which vote dilution was alleged); Shaw 11, 116 S. Ct. at 1906 ("If a § 2 violation is
proven for a particular area, it flows from the fact that individuals in this area have less op-
portunity.., to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice." (internal quotations omitted)).
323. Cf. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2662 (distinguishing claims of statewide vote dilution
from dilution in a smaller geographic area).
324. See Paul L. MeKaskle, The Voting Rights Act and the "Conscientious Redistricter,"
30 U.S.F. L. REv. 1, 64 (1995). Professor McKaskle writes:
There are many circumstances which justify, quite legitimately, departure from
districts that approach a square in shape. These circumstances include topogra-
phy (mountain ranges, rivers, bays), lines of communications and transportation,
local government boundaries (which themselves are often quite irregular), and
the like. Notions of compactness must also be considered in view of the fact that
while the entire area of any jurisdiction must be assigned to a district in the redis-
tricting process, the districts must also be equal in population. However, the
population density may vary enormously, hence some districts may be very small
but others will have to cover large areas to obtain the requisite popula-
tion.... Perhaps the most extreme example of this is the division of Nevada into
the two congressional districts allotted to it. One district is very compact, consti-
tuting the central urban core of metropolitan Las Vegas .... The other district
encompasses the rest of the state, some 109 thousand square miles, yet over half
of its population is clustered in a small area around Reno.
1d, at 64 & n.301 (emphasis added).
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ing a more responsive Senate is not in conflict with the Court's current
conceptions of equal protection, as pronounced by Shaw and its prog-
eny. On the contrary, to the extent that equal protection endorses the
goals of remedying past discrimination and preventing vote dilution,
the Fourteenth Amendment reinforces a modem translation of the
Progressives' aim of creating a more responsive Senate.
2. Translating Intent: The Influence of Money in Political
Campaigns
Obscured by the current debate over campaign finance reform
and its First Amendment implications is a significant fact: like today's
advocates of reform, the Progressives who fought for passage of the
Seventeenth Amendment were deeply concerned about the role of
money in politics. Direct election advocates believed that monied in-
terests such as large corporations exerted a disproportionate influence
on state legislatures' appointment of Senators.3 s Their cure for this
evil was to turn over the election of Senators to the people.26 How-
ever, because the people constituted a far larger electorate than did
members of state legislatures, the introduction of popular elections ac-
tually increased the influence of money.3 27 As C.H. Hoebeke observes
in his recent work on the direct election of Senators, direct election ad-
vocates failed to realize that "the more the democratization of the
electoral process, the more attention-in the form of organization and
money-would have to be devoted. The range of interests in any one
state were usually too broad to make direct appeals without a well fi-
nanced structure of coordination.
321
To a degree that Progressives could not possibly have imagined,
money now dominates Senate races.329 Because attempts at directly
curtailing spending invariably implicate the First A.Lmendment and
325. See HOEBEKE, supra note 9, at 98-106.
326. See id.
327. See id. at 105-06.
328. See id. Hoebeke's account suggests a practical explanation for the post-
ratification practice of at-large elections that is divorced from issues of original intent:
power. The promoters of the Amendment within the states-party bosses and organiza-
tions, large corporations and United States Senators themselves-tended to be entities
with statewide power and resources sufficient to mobilize statewide campaigns. See id, at
24, 105-06, 151-54. Who were the countervailing voices and how, in any event, could they
be heard? Certainly not minorities, who were precluded from voting in numerous states.
See supra note 282. Thus, the failure of states to adopt or maintain a districting system
can be explained as a function of which interests were the most powerful at the time of
the Seventeenth Amendment's adoption rather than a product of constitutional delibera-
tion.
329. See HOEBEKE, supra note 9, at 189-95.
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therefore must often withstand the most demanding constitutional
scrutiny,330 measures which make money less necessary in the first place
are the next best remedy. Senate districts would fulfill the aspirations
of direct election advocates without First Amendment complications
by reducing the need for money. House races on average cost less than
Senate races because House candidates must campaign among a
smaller constituency in a more limited geographic area than Senate
candidates.33' Applying this experience to Senate districts, it will gen-
eraly cost less to run in one half of a state than the entire state.332
The salutary effects of reducing the costs of Senate races would
not merely be to reduce the role of money in Senate campaigns; it
would also facilitate greater responsiveness on the part of the Senate
by diversifying its ranks. Non-traditional candidates such as minorities
and women, who have a far more difficult time raising money for all
types of political offices than their White male counterparts,' 33 would
be major beneficiaries. Senate seats would become more accessible to
them and other historically underrepresented interests because running
for the Senate would be less expensive.334
The effect of failing to translate into modem terms the Progres-
sives' concerns with the influence of money in Senate campaigns is that
the Seventeenth Amendment must be interpreted in a manner that ex-
acerbates a principal evil it sought to address. No form of originalism
should require such a perverse result.
3. Translating Intent: Uniformity between the Senate and House
A final translation argument is based on the debates among the
330. See, ag., Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n,
116 S. Ct. 2309,2338 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the Court has traditionally
applied strict scrutiny to "broad prophylactic caps on both spending and giving in the politi-
cal process").
331. See HARRIS, supra note 287, at 71.
332. Reducing the amount of money involved in Senate elections is no guarantee that
the influence of such money will be reduced. This shortcoming, however, is no different
from that of spending caps generally, which likewise reduce only the amounts of money
involved in political campaigns.
333. See Doug Brown, Women in Politics: Candidates Face Money Problems, L.A.
TIMES, June 27, 1986, at V1 (detailing fundraising difficulties of female candidates); Jerry
Knight, As the SEC Fights 'Pay-to-Play,' Minority Players Cry Foul, WASH. POST, July 16,
1994, at F1 (discussing recent SEC regulations which minority politicians believe will exacer-
bate their fundraising difficulties).
334. See Karlan, supra note 15, at 190 n.71 (noting that Black voters stand a better
chance of electing a minority-preferred candidate in a single-member district because the
cost of running is less and White voters in a smaller electorate may be more likely to know,
and therefore, more likely to support, the minority-preferred candidate).
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Seventeenth Amendment's drafters. The Sixty-second Congress's de-
bate over the Seventeenth Amendment was not about the merits of
directly electing Senators. Rather, it was a dispute over the degree of
uniformity that should exist between two coordinate bodies directly
elected by the people. The decision to apply the Elections Clause uni-
formly to the House and Senate can be interpreted narrowly: Congress
merely wished that there be federal oversight over both Senate and
House elections. This interpretation, however, ignores the dominant
rationale for Congress's decision: elections for both houses should be
subject to federal supervision because both houses possess the same
representative capacity. The modem role of the Senate supports ex-
tending the drafters' principle of uniformity to the manner by which
both houses are elected.
Whatever may have been the Framers' intentions for the Senate,
the Seventeenth Amendment has virtually abolished any notion of that
body representing states as states.335 As a consequence, states' power
in the national legislature has been greatly reduced.336  Rather than
335. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U.
CHI. L. Rnv. 1484, 1488 (1987) (book review) ("[T]he principal structural protection for
federalism, the direct representation of state legislatures in the Senate, was eliminated by
the seventeenth amendment."); see also Deborah J. Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and
State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 16 (1988) ("The
only constitutional provision that might have ensured some congressional representation
for [state] institutional interests-the selection of Senators by state legislatures-was
repealed in 1913.").
336. See McConnell, supra note 335, at 1488; see also George Anastaplo, Amendments
to the Constitution of the United States: A Commentary, 23 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 631, 809
(1992) (noting that the Seventeenth Amendment reduces the role of states in our consti-
tutional system); Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 205, at 145-46 (noting that after the
passage of the Seventeenth Amendment federal power increased because congressional
politicians began responding to national interest groups instead of state legislatures);
Jeffry C. Clark, The United States Proposal for a General Agreement on Trade in Services
and its Preemption of Inconsistent State Law, 15 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 75, 104
n.213 (1992) (noting the shift in the balance of powers between the federal and state gov-
ernments effected by the Seventeenth Amendment); Jerry Frug, Decentering
Decentralization, 60 U. Ci. L. REV. 253, 338 & n.199 (1993) (noting that the passage of
the Seventeenth Amendment raises considerable doubt whether Congress represents the
interests of states qua states); Douglas Laycock, Notes on the Role of Judicial Review, the
Expansion of Federal Power, and the Structure of Constitutional Rights, 99 YALE L.J.
1711, 1737-38 (1990) (book review) (explaining the direct election of Senators as an ac-
cretion of federal power at the expense of the states); Merritt, supra note 335, at 15-16 &
n.90 (questioning whether Senators ever actually represented the sovereign interests of
the states and finding that any such representation has been vanquished by the Seven-
teenth Amendment); Victoria L. Calkins, Note, State Sovereign Immunity After
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.: The Demise of the Eleventh Amendment, 32 WM. &
MARY L. Rv. 439,469 (1991) (arguing that the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment
has led to a shift of attention away from state and local concerns towards national interest
groups); John E. DuMont, Note, State Immunity from Federal Regulation-Before and
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representing the sovereign interests of states, Senators now represent a
variety of national interest groups-a role identical to that of House
members.337
In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,338 the
Supreme Court recognized, but did not find dispositive, the Senate's
diminished role as a repository of states' rights. Garcia involved the
application of the wage requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act
to municipal employees in San Antonio.339 Claiming that the Depart-
ment of Labor lacked authority under the Commerce Clause to impose
federal wage standards on municipal employees, the city of San Anto-
nio sued the federal government for declaratory relief. In answering
the city's objections, the Supreme Court departed from precedent re-
quiring a determination of whether the federal law invaded a
"traditional" local governmental fumction. Instead, the Court pro-
fessed its inability to identify "principled constitutional limitations on
the scope of Congress' Commerce Clause powers over the States
merely by relying on a priori definitions of state sovereignty." 34 It held
that states must look to the legislative process to prevent overreaching
by the federal government.343 This approach made sense, according to
the Court, because "the composition of the Federal Government was
After Garcia, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 391, 400 (1993) (arguing that "[s]ince the power to elect is
the power to control," the Seventeenth Amendment has decreased the influence of states
in the national government); Fernando R. Laguarda, Note, Federalism Myth: States as
Laboratories of Health Care Reform, 82 GEO. L.J. 159, 164 (1993) (arguing that the Sev-
enteenth Amendment is partially responsible for states, as such, having little influence
over Congress). But see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 259 (1991) ("Surely Sena-
tors continue to serve as the distinctive voice of the states that elect them.").
337. See Calkins, supra note 336, at 469 ("Representatives of both Houses of Congress
have developed independent constituencies among groups that support national initia-
tives, such as farmers, environmentalists, and the poor."); Albert P. Melone, The Senate's
Confirmation Role in Supreme Court Nominations and the Politics of Ideology Versus
Impartiality, 75 JUDICATURE 68, 73 (1991) (arguing that the Seventeenth Amendment
may have made Senators more responsive to interest group and grassroots awareness ofjudicial policy making). Indeed, the Senators have a greater necessity to cultivate na-
tional interest group constituencies since nationally mobilized interests are more likely to
target Senators than members of the House. See RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., THE UNITED
STATES SENATE: A BICAMERALPERSPECIVE 17 (1982).
The concern over the role of national interest groups continues to mount. A coali-
tion of Democrats and Republicans in the House of Representatives have proposed
campaign reform legislation that would limit congressional and senatorial candidates' out-
of-state campaign contributions. See H.R. REP. 104-2148 (1995).
338. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
339. See id. at 533.
340. See id. at 534.
341. See id at 545.
342. Id. at 548.
343. See id. at 550.
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designed in large part to protect the States from overreaching by Con-
gress."3"
More specifically, the Court recognized that the original Constitu-
tion gave states direct representation in the Senate through the
legislative appointment of federal Senators.345 Thus, the Garcia Court
seemed to give credence to the traditional notion of the Senate as a
guardian of state interests. However, in virtually the same breath, the
Court was forced to recognize the impact of the Seventeenth Amend-
ment on the state-centered conception of the Senate:
We realize that changes in the structure of the Federal Gov-
ernment have taken place since 1789, not the least of which
has been the substitution of popular election of Senators by
the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, and
that these changes may work to alter the influence of the
States in the federal political process.3
Justice Powell, dissenting with three other Justices, found the ma-
jority's concession regarding the reduced role of states in the national
government to be dispositive:
At one time in our history, the view that the structure of the
Federal Government sufficed to protect the States might
have had a somewhat more practical, although not a more
logical, basis.... [B]ut a variety of structural and political
changes occurring in this century have combined to make
Congress particularly insensitive to state and local values.
The adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment... the weak-
ening of political parties on the local level, and the rise of
national media, among other things, have made Congress in-
creasingly less representative of state and local interests, and
more likely to be responsive to the demands of various na-
tional constituencies.-37
Thus, although Garcia provides some support for a state-centered
conception of the Senate, it supports the proposition that the Senate
and House possess the same representative capacities. To the extent
that Garcia manifests a tension between the theory of the Senate and
its actual operation today, subsequent decisions of the Court have re-
solved the conflict in favor of the Senate's modem role. Hence, in US.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thorton,34 the Court recognized the Seventeenth
344. Id. at 550-51.
345. See id. at 551.
346. Id. at 554.
347. Id. at 565 n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
348. 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
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Amendment as an extension of the ideal embodied in Article I, Section
2, Clause 1-that the "Federal Government [is] directly responsible to
the people,... and chosen directly, not by States, but by the people."
' 49
Beyond the uniformity in their representative capacities, the
House and Senate have become institutionally similar in other impor-
tant respects, some of which are directly attributable to popular
elections. For instance, both Senators and Representatives now cam-
paign and raise funds throughout their terms even though Senators
have a tenure that is three times longer than House members.3'0 The
House and Senate have become so similar as institutions that congres-
sional scholars have theorized about a convergence of the roles of
Senators and House members.351  Even those who disagree with
"convergence theory" conclude that the most significant difference be-
tween the Senate and House is not that Senators are currently elected
on a statewide basis while House members are elected by districts, but
rather that the House is four times larger than the Senate.352 In this
context, electing Senators by district would not change the institutional
distinctions that remain between the House and Senate.353
349. Id. at 1863.
350. See Ross K. BAKER, HOUSE AND SENATE 184 (1995).
351. See id. While ultimately disagreeing with convergence theorists, Baker sets forth
the most commonly cited evidence of institutional convergence between the House and
the Senate:
1. The House has suffered a decline in the efficiency of its legislative process
and has become a more unpredictable body in the manner of the Senate.
2. A heavier senate workload and an increase in the numbers and the attendant
rise of influence of staff have caused a deterioration in the interpersonal comity
and accommodation that has long defined the Senate. This is associated with a
decline of institutional loyalty, disillusionment, and a more rapid turnover of
members and seems to point to more chances for stardom in the House.
3. Senators are beginning to experience greater electoral insecurity and to act
more like House members by campaigning almost constantly for six years, as the
House members do for the two years of their incumbency.
4. Senators are actually becoming more engrossed in the minutiae of legislation
and House members are acting like generalists-an apparently dramatic role re-
versal.
5. The value of leadership positions in the House-both party and committee-
has diminished, and the hierarchy of the House has become more flattened to
resemble that of the Senate where power is more evenly distributed.
L As is evident from the above enumeration, convergence theory does not focus on the
similarities in the representative capacities of the two houses, but instead is concerned
with other institutional overlap. Convergence theory is nevertheless relevant to a discus-
sion of Senate districts, for the fewer differences there are between the two houses,
whether related to their representative capacities or not, the less objection there can be to
electing both houses by districts.
352. See id. at 54-56.
353. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
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Fidelity to the intent of the enactors of the Seventeenth Amend-
ment requires recognition of a modem reality that the Amendment's
drafters foreshadowed: the symmetry in the representative capacities
and institutional characters of the House and Senate. But these simi-
larities, in turn, raise questions about what differences are
constitutionally required. Does an intent to ensure that both houses
possess the same representative capacity mean that House members
and Senators can both be elected by districts? In other words, where
does the principle of uniformity end?
Whatever lingering confusion about the Senate remained after the
ratification of the Constitution, it was clear that the Senate was in-
tended to be a counterweight to the House in much the same way the
legislative branch would act as a check on the presidency.3 4 The uni-
formity principle ends where its pursuit would defeat the Founders'
purposes in creating a bicameral national legislature. Senate districts in
no way thwart this bicameralism. Such districts are thus within the in-
terpretive ambit of the uniformity principle established by the Sixty-
second Congress.
Direct elections naturally limit the mechanisms available for
achieving the counterbalance contemplated by the original Framers. A
difference in constituency-election by state legislatures rather than
the people-is no longer a feature of bicameralism. But the aim of bi-
cameralism is achieved through a host of other distinctions that remain,
distinctions James Madison specifically identified in Federalist No. 62:
the different qualifications for Senators, their longer terms, and their
distinct powers under the Constitution.35 5 Senate districts obviously do
not affect such idiosyncrasies.
There is, however, one bicameral distinction that the Founders ar-
guably contemplated which Senate districts would affect-the size of
the electorate. In Federalist No. 10, Madison advanced the view that
large electorates were most likely to guard against "unworthy candi-
dates [who] practise with success the vicious arts, by which elections
are too often carried." 356 In other words, a larger electorate would
354. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 62,
at 415 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (discussing the distinct characteristics
of the Senate).
355. See THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 415 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961); see also id. No. 63, at 422 (discussing the longer duration of Senators' terms).
356. Id. No. 10, at 63. Madison reasoned that:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and inter-
ests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more
frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the num-
ber of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within
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most likely ensure the election of men who would advocate the public
good rather than the interests of factions. In Federalist No. 63, Madi-
son returned to his arguments in support of an extensive republic, or
large electorate, in explaining the protections afforded by the Senate.
He admonished that in assessing the advantage of a Senate, "we must
be careful not to separate it from the other advantage, of an extensive
territory."' 7 Thus, it is clear that Madison viewed bicameralism, and
more specifically the role of the Senate, as an "auxiliaryprecaution[]"
to the protections already afforded by a large electorate."
The import of Madison's insights for Senate districts is unclear.
The Framers decided against the direct election of Senators; hence,
Federalists Nos. 10 and 63 do not speak directly to the modem reality
of direct elections. Yet, it is reasonable to infer that the Framers would
have sought a large electorate for the Senate 5 9 Senate districts fulfill
this intent. The Framers likely did not anticipate the existence of na-
tion-sized states like California and Texas, to name a few'o In all but a
handful of states, Senate districts would not only be larger than House
districts,3" but would contain millions of inhabitants per district, num-
bers more than sufficient to fulfill the goal of Federalist No. 10 to
control the destabilizing factions which might otherwise prosper in a
small electorate.36 2
which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans
of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties
and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a
common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common mo-
tive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own
strength, and to act in unison with each other.
Id. at 63-64.
357. Id. NO. 63, at 428.
358. Id at 425.
359. In addition to Federalist No. 10, James Wilson's proposal for large interstate Senate
districts also support this conclusion. See supra note 113. Finally, a preference for a large
United States Senate electorate might be inferred from Madison's critique of Thomas Jeffer-
son's draft of the Virginia Constitution, in which Madison expressed a preference for
statewide voting for state Senators, who would in turn represent distinct districts. See Madi-
son to Jefferson, Oct. 15, 1788, in THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON (Robert A. Rutland et
al. eds., University Press of Virginia 1977), XI, 286; Rakove, supra note 96, at 429 n.11.
360. The current population of California is 31,431,000; the current population of
Texas is 18,378,000. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 26 (1994). By contrast, at the time of the nation's first census in 1790,
the entire population of the country was only four million. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO
THE PRESENT 7 (1965).
361. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
362. Indeed, the current size of the electorate in Senate campaigns appears to have per-
verted the salutary effects that the Framers associated with large electorates. Hoebeke
elaborates on this unintended consequence of direct elections:
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Moreover, the Framers did not live in a society in which techno-
logical and transportation advances and national interest groups had
effectively nationalized politics, particularly Senate elections.3'6 Con-
cerns with small electorates, already inapposite due to population
growth since the founding, hold even less sway in light of these modem
realities. These nationalizing forces would effectively "extend the
sphere"3 4 of each district's Senate contests, ensuring the benefits of a
large electorate even in a smaller unit.
Thus, Senate districts are permissible if they meet the concerns of
Federalist No. 10 and do not otherwise undermine bicameralism. In
the absence of evidence that either of these aspirations would be
harmed, and in light of the modem uniformity between the House and
Senate, Senate districts are consonant with the broad aims of the draft-
ers of the Seventeenth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
The Constitution contains no express-or for that matter, neces-
sarily implied-prohibition against Senate districts. To the contrary,
the Constitution's text, the Founders' original conception of the Senate
and the congressional debates on the Seventeenth Amendment all
support the permissibility of Senate districts. Moreover, the broad
purposes of the Seventeenth Amendment leave little doubt that dis-
tricts are consonant with its modem application.
The parallel language of the Seventeenth Amendment and Article
I, Section 2, Clause 1; the broad command of the Elections Clause of
Article I; the Qualifications Clause of the Seventeenth Amendment;
and the Tenth Amendment all support the permissibility of Senate dis-
tricts as a textual matter. Indeed, in every other instance in which the
Constitution has given states authority to prescribe the manner of
electing a federal official (i.e., Representatives, the President and the
Vice-President), its text has been read to allow districting, directly or
What James Madison observed a century previously with regard to the size of an
assembly ... proved equally true for the size of a constituency. The larger the
electorate, "the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs by which its
motions are directed." In form, "the government may become more democratic,
but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic." In short, the historical
trend toward greater popularization of senate elections... had given rise to the
very conditions which reformers hoped to end with even more popularization.
Inevitably, big spending, the pressure of organized interests, and backstage ma-
neuvering would continue to characterize the campaigns of senators long after
the nostrum of direct elections had been administered.
HOEBEKE, supra note 9, at 105-06 (citations omitted).
363. See supra notes 287-91 and accompanying text.
364. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 63-64 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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indirectly. Thus, it would be anomalous, to say the least, to imply a
senatorial exemption from districting into the Constitution.
The pre-Seventeenth Amendment history of the Senate likewise
supports the permissibility of creating districts. Though long over-
looked, the Federalists, whose constitutional scheme prevailed in 1789,
harbored a populist (albeit inconsistent) conception of the Senate.
Yet, even if the Founders could not quite make up their minds about
the nature of the upper house they were creating, the Sixty-second
Congress resolved the matter by passing the Seventeenth Amendment
on the theory that both houses represent the people rather than the
states.
The totality of the historical evidence supports the permissibility
of districts, but this conclusion is bolstered by a broader view of the
Amendment's original intent through the application of translation
originalism. The ends sought to be achieved by the enactors of the
Amendment-greater responsiveness to the electorate, a reduction in
the influence of money in politics and uniformity in the representative
capacities of the House and Senate-would all be facilitated by Senate
districts.
Thus, the power to create Senate districts appears to have been
willed to the people. They have only to rediscover their sovereignty
and employ it in order to improve our democracy.
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